

Working Paper No. : PPF/02/2020

Hybrid Warfare : Concept & Implications for India



PPF - Centre for Radicalisation and Security Studies

July 2020

Spreading Awareness

Building Capacity

Promoting Resilience

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Founded in 2005, Policy Perspectives Foundation (PPF) is a non-profit apolitical think tank. Its activities focus on complex and inter-connected challenges to internal peace, stability and development in India. It promotes debates and dialogues with scholars, development practitioners, civil society, government organisations and other stakeholders, and undertakes training, research and advocacy programmes on issues of national interest.

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A Few Words

The Policy Perspectives Foundation (PPF) is happy to present this monograph on “Hybrid Warfare: Concepts and Implications for India” by Prof. Gautam Sen, Visiting Professor, PPF. The author is well known in the Indian strategic community. He is known for his sharp, deep, and often forthright insights in the area of defence and strategic analysis. The monograph penned by him also reflects all these qualities. We are grateful to him for agreeing to write on this subject which we consider particularly relevant in the present times of uncertainty.

A question may arise as to why PPF is interested in publishing this monograph as 'warfare' is not one of our areas of focus. True! PPF has, so far, been mainly concerned with factors and issues that impact or influence India's internal peace and stability. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the rationale of our interest in this area briefly. A wider discussion must, however, wait for a monograph proposed to be published as a companion volume to this document later in the year.

The central question to ponder over is 'What would be the nature of future wars?' The rapid growth in instrumentation and automation of equipment and weapons of war has steadily been lowering the gap between capacity of warring sides to inflict destruction and lethality on their opponents. Today, it is not uncommon to see economically weaker nations acquiring nuclear capability and compelling the acknowledged global leaders to begin a dialogue with them. Terrorism, similarly, has become a huge threat to mankind which is mostly targeting non-combatant civilians. Victories achieved against the groups like AQ and IS at great cost have lessened but not eliminated the threat completely. In certain jurisdictions, terrorism remains a persisting threat with nation states using/manipulating such groups to achieve their short-term goals. I mention 'short-term' as most of these nation states also pay a price as in the process they degrade their own capacity and credibility of governance.

The nature of future war throws up several other questions about factors that will shape its contours. There is a tendency embedded within the emerging nature of war that the nations/who have most to lose in a conflict tend to fight increasingly a remote war – firing weapons from a distance and/or using resources available locally or regionally to target the identified vulnerabilities of the opponent using other easily available means including non-state actors.

All vulnerabilities of geopolitics, environment, economy and critical information infrastructure become targets to inflict damage in such a war. Since many such targets lie deep within the country and fall under the purview of non-military agencies, a much greater awareness and much greater preparation would necessarily be required on the part of the latter to address threats of emerging war. In short, the civilian dimension of the hybrid war would require attention to build resilience capable of absorbing the impact of attacks, recovering quickly and rising to defend the assets in the civilian sector.

The recent COVID-19 crises have provided several lessons that must be learnt. In a demography like ours, local level agencies are a pivotal part of the response system and thus, their capabilities must be built. Further, the threat of hybrid war must be understood by the civilian governance structures as well. This will require envisioning appropriate interlinking of crucial components of local administration, building a credible channel of communication and developing a synergy of purpose. Many of our existing hierarchies are legacies of the past that have served their purpose in their time, now they should be reinvented and tailored to suit the current and future needs of governance.

Our Defence forces are our ultimate defence. The frontiers of hybrid wars in many cases would be in the middle of our lives, disrupting the comfort zones created by systems that we have grown used to socially, economically, and politically. Since hybrid warfare may use/exploit misguided members of the society, our conventional deterrents must be alert and effective. But premature and overuse of the military in this sphere on the ground, might adversely impact the goodwill enjoyed by them. It is, therefore, critically important not to deploy them in situations that might degenerate into hybrid war within the civilian domain. At the same time, there should be an effective synergy amongst the Civilian and Defence agencies about the understanding and identification of the hybrid war and its dynamics. The second part of the Hybrid Warfare monograph dwells upon these issues which civil agencies must deal with.

The monograph by Prof Sen brings out in bold relief the concept and the need for developing indigenous research and thinking on hybrid warfare within the strategic community. Prof Sen and we at PPF will feel vindicated if our hope is even partially met.

P C Haldar
President, PPF

New Delhi

Dated : 15-05-2020

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Hybrid Warfare : Policy Implications for India

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.

— Carl von Clausewitz ^[7]

Abstract

The term “hybrid warfare” describes a strategy that employs conventional military force supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics. Conventional Western concepts of war are incompatible and fundamentally misaligned with the realities of conflict in the twenty-first century. The emergence of a unipolar post-Cold War world order has resulted in a significant paradigm shift. This change has to be ingested by India which is faced with serious issues on security since the early eighties especially after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. A variety of complex situation has been faced by the Indian Government and the Indian security organisations ranging from separatist movements, secessionist movements, terrorist movement, cross border proxy war conducted by Pakistan in the form of Jihadi war based on religious fundamentalism including home grown terrorism. All these required and continue to require the Indian nation state to take actions to contain the threats that they posed to the very existence of the Indian nation state and required adoption of new legal, psychological, and strategic understanding of warfare and use of force, particularly by state actors from across the international borders from Pakistan. The term “hybrid war” which the military is comfortable to label as “hybrid threat” implies/connotes the use of conventional military power supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics. In a tactical sense, the Russian concept of “nonlinear conflict” is an example of tacticising the hybrid warfare strategy. Hence we have to be very precise to distinguish between linear and non-linear conflicts which can be summed up as “Linear conflicts are defined by a sequential progression of a planned strategy by opposing sides, whereas nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of multiple, complementary military and

non-military warfare tactics.”¹ In this essay attempt has been made to understand the theoretical moorings of the Hybrid warfare and understand why Hybrid threats which have plagued the nation states around the world ever since the end of World War-II. The root cause of a hybrid threat emanates from a crisis of identity, unevenness in political economy amongst states and last but not the least from the method of governance and administering of governance across the international border. A global overview of the Countries where the Hybrid Warfare has taken place and covers the history of operation has been incorporated.

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1. See the extended explanation on Hybrid and Non Linear Warfare at <https://globalsecurityreview.com/hybrid-and-non-linear-warfare-systematically-erases-the-divide-between-war-peace/> In essence it is useful to record the following: Linear conflicts are defined by a sequential progression of a planned strategy by opposing sides, whereas nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare tactics. A nonlinear war is fought when a state employs conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults. Confusion and disorder ensue when weaponized information exacerbates the perception of insecurity in the populace as political, social, and cultural identities are pitted against one another. This "blurring" divides influential interest groups and powerful political organizations by exploiting identity politics and allegiances. Additionally, nonlinear warfare tactics act as a deterrent towards a more powerful ally of the besieged state. To use the Ukrainian conflict as an example, Russian tactics in the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent civil war in eastern Ukraine caught the West off guard (the U.S. and U.K., in particular) and unable to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty. NATO's inaction can, at least, partially be attributed to the rigid military taxonomy presently employed to define warfare. More critically, Russian military and intelligence experts have accurately identified and exploited international legal frameworks governing the use of force against a sovereign state. Take, for instance, the dichotomy that exists in the realm of international law between the concept of "war" and the idea of cyber conflict, electronic warfare, and information warfare. To date, there hasn't been any measurable Western response to Russian hybrid aggression. Unless the legal framework defining an act of aggression is reworked, liberal democracies are at risk. Presently, it seems increasingly clear that the primary means of ensuring the continued rule of law is by overhauling our traditional interpretation of conflict. The West must develop a framework of strategic deterrence of weaponized information, finance, and other subversive forms of aggression. A "one size fits all" policy would not be an effective deterrence. Analysts should review conflicts independently. The degree with which states will employ non-military and active measures will vary significantly, as will the actual measures themselves. While this factor complicates the development of a usable framework for countering hybrid threats, it is not a complete impediment. Further, the flexible nature of hybrid warfare allows for more of a "trial-and-error" approach to foreign intervention, not unlike the agile development process used in marketing and technology firms. Developing a comprehensive suite of actor-specific offensive-defense or defense-through-guaranteed-aggression policies-underwritten by a demonstrated ability to launch a multilateral response-would serve as one measure to dissuade further aggression from irregular powers and rogue states.

Observations

1. The global situations plaguing peace and stability indicates that it is absolutely essential to study the Hybrid warfare which have engulfed nation states world-wide.
2. Non state actors with the aid of technology will become more and more potent hybrid threats to nation state having diverse ethnic and religious minorities.
3. There will be an increase in secessionist and separatist movement where those nation state have been unable to take along those section of society which consider a threat to their cultural, religious and ethnic identities.
4. There will occur migration of population from those states which persecute their minorities to the neighbouring states which are economically prosperous and tolerant to such minorities who can be identified with the receiving/ sanctuary states.
5. Population migration will not only pose economic pressure but also strain bilateral relations.
6. Population migration will also bring its wake the security risk of international terrorists to infiltrate with the refugee elements.
7. With international terrorism well established as the darker side of globalisation, the chances of hybrid threats emanating from international terrorism will increase, attempts to make international borders between neighbouring states porous and sustain proxy war easier, create better money laundering through international banking transactions to support separatist and secessionist movement and create disruptive political situation more vulnerable to hybrid threats.
8. Nation states will have to perforce resort to contain the non-linear conflict by adopting hybrid warfare strategy as a doctrine and as a part of operations to be undertaken by the regular security forces and the associated paramilitary forces in an integrated fashion. This will be a major paradigm shift in conflict management.
9. Nation states under hybrid threats will have to forge newer strategic alliances to contain hybrid threats

10. Nation states under interdependent strategic alliance/partnership will have to create newer doctrine and strategic outlook to contain hybrid threats which are especially based on external religious fundamentalism, territorial disputes related to international borders and crisis of identities.
11. Nation states will have to identify the internal elements which will aid the perpetrators of hybrid threats. This is far more easier to state than actually operationalise and institutionalise the homeland security measures to neutralise hybrid threats to nation states.

Recommendations

1. There is a need to study the economic aspect of Hybrid Threat. How is the Hybrid threat tactics by neighborhood states funded and by what means. Hence there is a need to develop a process of interdependency for studying this aspect in an interdependent mode with non-governmental agencies/think tanks and individual researchers.
2. Internationally and presently in the Indian context, Hybrid warfare and Hybrid threats are occurring in the areas which are contagious to International borders. Most Hybrid threats against which India may have to mount Hybrid warfare to contain as well as neutralize has started emanating from inside the state far away from international borders or across the undermarketed borders or across the line of control. Cultural perspectives.
3. These Hybrid threats as enumerated in para 2 needs to be tabulated in a chronological manner to understand the temporal perspective to augment our decision making process.
4. We have given an extensive survey on issues related to our observations in para 3 above. Government may task the Internal agencies to pay special attention to study the contents of the same as enumerated in the present study.
5. Neighborhood studies as we have noted will not be complete unless the present study also incorporates an takes on board the corporate and the industrial sectors. As in the area of trade and commerce they have not been able to undo the influence of the cheapest products available which undermine India's capacity to counter even though the Chinese products are found to be substandard.
6. Matching alertness with the points raised in para 5 above is an absolute necessity for the Indian state.
7. The Government may examine the existing systems in place and explore the possibility of upgrading the same appropriately to achieve the above objectives.
8. In to-days information age and hybrid threats era we need to strengthen those in India who do advocacy for India. The role of Advocacy should be strengthened. At the moment such actions are at Junior Levels whose academic and intellectual moorings may

not inspire confidence for policy formulations/propagation. The ministries should examine their own agencies and their inputs and should co-opt non-governmental agencies/think tanks and individual researchers in the process.

9. It is recommended that Banking intelligence systems should be further strengthened by the government to focus on possible money laundering by disruptive elements that can cause hybrid threats which are to be addressed from a socio-political and economic aspects.
10. There is a need to study the migration pattern that is taking place from the neighborhood states into India. There seems to be little evidence of nefarious activities emanating from outside. More internal disruptions have been noted. The migration does not only comprise of persecuted minorities but also others. Large scale disruptive elements has the potential to migrate through this porous membrane and has the potential to create sleeper cells to be activated at desired time by their handlers to cause Hybrid threats. There is a need to strengthen India's counter intelligence capability and also have a separate unit to counter sleeper cells within the country.
11. We have to create people to people contact methodology.
12. In a long term perspective a socio cultural and an ethnic anthropological study should be undertaken of the neighborhood states.
13. The economically weaker of the neighborhood states can be exploited by larger economic powers as well as those states which have opposed India on ideological base.
14. Role of China which has a stranglehold in India's neighborhood through initiatives like CPEC, BAR for a strategic needs of establishing access to warm water port in the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal needs an exhaustive study from Indian perspectives. Such a study should include the Chinese acquisition of port facilities in the Indian Ocean region to include the littoral states of the Indian Ocean states affecting India in the Southern Asian zone up to Africa and Straits of Malacca.
15. Chinese Arms sale, positioning of Chinese Military platforms, Chinese inland infrastructural developments near international land borders with India with other neighborhood states, extending strategic road communication system to a number of neighborhood states is a serious matter which needs immediate attention from a strategic and Hybrid threat evaluation to India.

16. As a corollary, if China's stand on the South China Sea is a definite indicator that if she becomes truly capable to flex her military muscle then she will not entertain any country's presence in the South China Sea region. This evaluation is recommended to be of primary importance to India.
17. Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean should receive focused strategic attention from India to retain and consolidate its preeminent power status in the region.

Policy Implications for India

Taking into consideration the theoretical and the historical narrative related to the development of Hybrid Warfare and Hybrid Threat enumerated in the present document, the following recommendations are made :

1. Hybrid warfare tactics and the strategies adopted has to be incorporated in the security forces operational mandate. This will encompass the role of the Armed Forces at all levels to produce a Jointness in command and control not only amongst the three services but also with other security organisations.
2. Information sharing amongst each other and dissemination to the existing nodal agency to filter information to become actionable intelligence is a must. Hopefully with the CDS having taken over, the Department of Military Affairs will concentrate on strategizing military diplomacy with reality on ground at international and national levels. Maximum number of Joint Exercises is a must between strategic partners.
3. There is an urgent need to study the security structures of volatile neighbouring states with the Eurasian states and China.
4. To pre-empt any serious security threat to the Indian Ocean zone, a combined strategic partnership between India and Russia is a must so as to prevent China from entering the zone. This is also necessary to pre-empt any hybrid security threats to take shape from any of the Southern or Far Eastern nation state forming the Eastern part of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean.
5. India has to be particularly be sensitive to study the linkages between the domestic factors and its imperatives of Afghanistan's external relationships with Eurasian Countries.
6. China as an major actor needs to be isolated strategically and internationally. This can be achieved if India mends her fences with Russia and other Eurasian States along with other Western actors. A strong and a functional strategic partnership between India and Russia will provide much needed strategic stability.
7. The lack of literature and classified study of the security structure of Afghanistan involving Eurasian States and India must be noted and there is an urgent need to do an

in-depth strategic analysis as well as political economy of the states involved. This will allow India to understand the possible Hybrid threats that can emanate from these areas towards India.

8. India has to develop the soft power based on qualitative research outputs to construct alternative paradigm of foreign and security policies towards the volatile and unstable neighbouring nation states and also to contain such countries like Malaysia who have taken strong positions against India in the International Organisations.

Introduction

The purpose of this very compressed theoretical piece is to provide the future readers the conceptual and theoretical moorings of Hybrid Warfare. Adequate care has been taken to give extensive corroborating scholarly and policy-oriented writings that has appeared not only in the post 2006 but also the linkage to previous works on the larger issue of War and Violence. The presentation is hence a referral research essay to aid Researchers and policy makers in their quest to understand the complexities that the Global system will face in the 21st Century.

It is truism when one recollects the immortal words of Plato that only the dead have seen the end of all wars. Over the centuries and millennia wars have been categorised under different names and different nomenclature. Each type of warfare had a purposeful precondition and each century of history gave a different label ranging from guerrilla warfare to revolutionary war to terrorism to fourth generation warfare(4GW)² till we arrive at sub-conventional and conventional conflicts ending with the latest known as the hybrid war emerging in the first quarter of the 21st century. The last three tabulated are often occurring often as intra state than interstate. While terrorism could be identified as the darker side of globalisation, hybrid warfare³ can be resorted to be used by a traditional state actor like the Russian involvement in the Ukraine in addition to using a local hybrid proxy, though Russia denied involvement in the Ukraine conflict. Hence the global system comprising of sovereign nation states are facing

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2. See Marine Corps Gazette in October 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." It explains that "In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them."
 3. For detail analysis see Fleming, Brian P. (2011-05-19). "Hybrid threat concept: contemporary war, military planning and the advent of unrestricted operational art" (pdf). United States Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05, Grant, Greg (2008-05-01). "Hybrid Wars". Government Executive. National Journal Group. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05 and Deep, Alex (2015-03-02). "Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

an adversary that incorporates "diverse and dynamic combination of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities."⁴ Hybrid warfare is the epitome of the process of tacticising the military strategy by employing political and economic warfare and further create a singularity between conventional, irregular and cyber warfare⁵. This process is further juxtaposed with an element of psychological warfare by using "fake news", "diplomacy" and even intervening the "electoral process".⁶ Hence the actor which may be a state or a non-state actor precipitates a complex dynamic battle space which can remain highly flexible and adaptable situationally as well as geographically⁷. Finally there are a plethora of terms used to refer to the concept of hybrid war: hybrid threat, hybrid adversary, hybrid influencing etc. It is essential to note that most US military literature categorises them as hybrid threat while the body of academic literature labels them as hybrid warfare. It will always be a useful lexicon to use the two terms "hybrid threat" and "hybrid warfare" in an interchangeable fashion to convey the exact nuance.⁸

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4. I have retrieved this from Fleming, Brian P United States Army Command and General Staff college, " Hybrid Threat Concept: contemporary war, military Planning and the advent of unrestricted operational art" (pdf). (2011-05-19 at <https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-tech-turmoil-new-censorship/?CNDID=50121752>)
 5. Read "Menacing Malware Shows the Dangers of Industrial System At <https://www.wired.com/story/triton-malware-dangers-industrial-system-sabotage/?CNDID=50121752>.
 6. For a detailed exposition see "It's the (Democracy-Poisoning) Golden Age of Free Speech". Wired. Standish, Reid (2018-01-18). "Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2018-01-31. [...] hybrid warfare: the blending of diplomacy, politics, media, cyberspace, and military force to destabilize and undermine an opponent's government. And "Defense lacks doctrine to guide it through cyberwarfare". nexgov.com. "Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?". NATO Review
 7. Information Week Government, "Auditors Find DoD Hasn't Defined Cyber Warfare"
 8. See Oxford Bibliographies article in Military History at [HTTPS://WWW.OXFORDBIBLIOGRAPHIES.COM/VIEW/ DOCUMENT/OBO-9780199743292/OBO-9780199743292-0260.XML](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/OBO-9780199743292/OBO-9780199743292-0260.XML) IS QUOTED AS "Hybrid warfare has been the bandwagon term to describe modern warfare in academic, policy, and journalist accounts. It describes a wide array of warfare techniques that do not correspond with earlier notions of warfare. Yet none of these are really to be called "new" and the military thought associated with them can be traced back as early as Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Perhaps it was the shock of being faced with unfamiliar tactics, the breach of morality with hybrid tactics disregarding jus in bello principles, or the rigged black/white understanding of the dichotomy of war and peace-but whatever the reason, it has led to a plethora of terms and monikers to describe the phenomena now labeled hybrid warfare. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for example, in discussing the "gray zone," points out that this topic has had many monikers within the US literature. To name a few: low-intensity conflict or low-intensity operations, small wars (this one did lead to an excellent online journal called Small Wars Journal, or SWJ), irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Hybrid warfare might indeed encompass a low-intensity operations type of conflict. All of these include elements of hybridity and hybrid warfare In particular the authors seek to address the perception that hybrid warfare has mainly been conducted by the adversaries of the West. Western governments do use hybrid tactics and hybridity comes to the front in counterinsurgency".

Origins of Hybrid Warfare

The issue concerning the origin of the term Hybrid Warfare has been summed up here by quoting from Harvard Bibliography as "The term hybrid warfare, as currently used, was first introduced by US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman in 2006, though Hoffman states he took the term from a thesis by Robert G Walker in which Walker describes low-intensity operations conducted by the US Marines. Mockaitis (1995)⁹ is the earliest modern source we could find using hybrid war. In 2006 Hoffman referred to the phenomena as "complex irregular warfare" (Hoffman 2006), Hoffman(2006)¹⁰ building forward on work he conducted with US Marine Corps General James Mattis in 2005 in an opinion piece in United States Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine (Mattis and Hoffman(2005)).¹¹ In 2007 Hoffman gave the first definition of hybrid warfare in academic published work: "Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder" (Hoffman 2007, p.14)¹². This definition would be revised a couple of times by Hoffman and others. Noteworthy in this discussion is Bjerregaard 2012¹³, which contests the idea of hybrid warfare being a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Rob de Wijk's contribution in the Oxford Handbook of War captures the discussion to that point well, while predicting the debates linked to hybrid warfare that play today (De Wijk, 2012)¹⁴. By 2015, an excellent overview of the discussion appeared in Tenenbaum 2015 (in French) and in Thornton 2015."¹⁵

9. Hybrid Warfare, John G.L.J. Jacobs, Martijn W.M. Kitzen

10. Hoffman, Frank G. "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs." *Orbis* 50.3 (2006): 395-411.

11. Mattis, James N., and Frank G. Hoffman. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine* 131.11 (2005): 18-19.

12. Hoffman, Frank G. *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

13. Bjerregaard, Thomas. "Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?" Thesis for the Master of Military Art and Science, General Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012.

14. De Wijk, Rob. "Hybrid Conflict and the Changing Nature of Actors." In *The Oxford Handbook of War*. Edited by Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer, 358-372. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

15. Thornton, Rod. "The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare." *The RUSI Journal* 160.4 (2015).

Defining Hybrid Warfare

Defining, a hybrid threat or hybrid warfare has led to many a debate because there is no universally acceptable definition to explain them. The term hybrid warfare at a normative and intellectual level appears to be too abstract and the latest thinking seriously consider referring to irregular methods to counter a conventionally superior force. As recorded in many a reference essays that "The abstractness of the term means that it is often used as a "catch all term" for all non-linear threats".¹⁶

Hybrid warfare has the following aspects and characteristics:

- It is non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state actor
- A hybrid adversary often uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods.¹⁷
- A hybrid adversary is flexible and adapts quickly¹⁸.
- A hybrid adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies.¹⁹
- Its Use of mass communication networks offers powerful propaganda and recruiting tools.²⁰ The use of fake news websites to spread false stories is an element of hybrid warfare.²¹

16. Jasper, Scott; Moreland, Scott (2014-12-02). "The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05. Fleming, Brian P. (2011-05-19). "Hybrid threat concept: contemporary war, military planning and the advent of unrestricted operational art" (pdf). United States Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05. Grant, Greg (2008-05-01). "Hybrid Wars". Government Executive. National Journal Group. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

17. Deep, Alex (2015-03-02). "Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05; Pindjāk, Peter (2014-11-18). "Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?". NATO Review. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05; Hoffman, Frank (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. p. 24; Standish, Reid (2018-01-18). "Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2018-01-22.

18. El Mawy, Reda (2014-09-30). "Islamic State 'adapting to US-led air strikes'". BBC News. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

19. Whitney, Craig R. (December 2012). "Ruling Arms". World Policy Journal. Archived from the original on 28 December 2012. Retrieved 17 June 2016; Schroeder, Matt & Lamb, Guy (2006). "The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa" (PDF). African Analyst. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2007. Retrieved 17 June 2016.

20. Standish, Reid (2018-01-18). "Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2018-01-22.

21. Lucian Kim, Russia having success in hybrid war against Germany), Reuters (February 7, 2016).

- A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields. the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community.²²

Effective Response to Hybrid War

Responding to hybrid warfare in general by traditional armed forces is difficult and so also by those organisations which are responsible collective defence mechanism. Both by individual nation states or the alliance system members collectively can hardly concur on the source of conflict or the locus of violence or labelling the responsibility of the perpetrators of hybrid warfare. When even today there is no consensus on defining terrorism it is even more difficult to define who are the perpetrators of hybrid warfare.

An article published in Global Security Review entitled "What is Hybrid Warfare"? See <https://globalsecurityreview.com/hybrid-and-non-linear-warfare-systematically-erases-the-divide-between-war-peace/> It compares the notion of hybrid warfare to the Russian concept of "non-linear" warfare. It defines non-linear warfare as the deployment of "conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults."

A survey of the case studies on hybrid warfare which involves the use of hard power or military power shows that such application of force was insufficient to contain it. The conflict often evolves below the visible/perception levels level, the causes remain unknown and reaction to contain and neutralise by the fastest means turns out to be too late.

In real term the hybrid adversaries remain unassailable. No quantum of force used to neutralise is useful to act as deterrent. More than anything else the hybrid adversaries have larger flexibility²³, display more innovativeness as against the regular militaries which are rigid in their approach toward their conceptualisation of warfare having a set or static military taxonomy to undertake any operations against the hybrid adversary.²⁴

22. McCuen, John J. "Hybrid Wars". Military Review. 88 (2): 107.

23. Deep, Alex (2015-03-02). "Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05.; Pindják, Peter (2014-11-18). "Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?". NATO Review. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

24. Hoffman, Frank (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 20-22.

History of Hybrid War and Hybrid Adversaries

The combination of conventional and irregular methods is not new and has been used throughout history. Some historians find the origins of the concept in the campaigns waged in ancient Hispania by the Lusitanian leader Viriathus or the renegade general Sertorius against the forces of the Roman Republic in the 2nd and 3rd centuries B.C. respectively²⁵. Elements of hybrid warfare are also seen in the concept of *la petite guerre*, a sort of reconnaissance in force practiced by light troops in European armies during the 17th and 18th centuries. A few examples of this type of combat are found in the American Revolution (a combination of Washington's Continental Army with militia forces) and Napoleonic Wars (British regulars cooperated with Spanish guerrillas). One can also find examples of hybrid warfare in smaller conflicts during the nineteenth century. For instance, between 1837 and 1840 Rafael Carrera, a Conservative peasant rebel leader in Guatemala, waged a successful military campaign against the Liberals and the Federal government of Central America utilizing a strategy that combined classical guerrilla tactics with conventional operations. Carrera's hybrid approach to warfare gave him the edge over his numerically superior and better armed enemies.²⁶

25. The Roman Campaign in Hispania during the second Punic war was one of strategic necessity. From 218 to 211 BC it was led by the elder Scipio brothers, Gnaeus and Publius Cornelius Scipio. Their primary objective was to prevent reinforcements from Spain from reaching Italy, and to this end they attacked the Ebro valley at the battles of Cissa, and Ebro river, they carved out a strategically very important region of Roman control. Their victory two years later at Dertosa expanded their area of control, and coming as it did soon after the disaster at Cannae, was an important Roman victory. After consolidating Roman territory, they hired 20,000 Celt-Iberian mercenaries, and met Carthage in the Baetis (Guadalquivir) River valley in southwest Hispania. This, however, proved a disaster. Carthage bribed the mercenaries to betray Rome, and both Scipios were killed. Soon after this, Scipio Africanus, the son of Publius Cornelius, who was killed at Baetis river, took command of the Campaign in Rome and won great victories at New Carthage, Beacula, and finally, at the battle of Silpia, drove Carthage entirely out of Spain. This is the perhaps the earliest recorded hybrid warfare strategy recorded.

26. Carrera was born on 24 October 1814 in the Candelaria barrio of Guatemala City towards the end of the Spanish colonial period. He was of humble origin, a mestizo and illiterate. He first worked as a farmhand. He enlisted in the army during the civil war, which lasted from 1826 to 1829. In 1835, he left the army and moved to Mataquescuintla where he married Petrona García and worked as a swineherd. Carrera rallied the peasants into armed resistance. Strongly supported by the Church, Carrera became de facto ruler of much of Guatemala and led a large uprising of Indians and poor peasants of mixed race in the east and south of the country, an area known as "The Mountain" The movement was strongly pro-Catholic and eager to restore many of the colonial religious institutions and traditions that the liberals had abandoned. Francisco Morazán repeatedly drove Carrera's forces out of cities and towns, but Carrera's followers would retake places as soon as Morazán's army left. For almost a decade, he was content being a military commander and enjoyed the respect of his followers. Even though they distrusted and despised him, the conservative criollos from the Aycinena Clan, decided to support Carrera in the hope of regaining the power and privileges that they had lost in 1829 after Morazán's invasion of Guatemala. Under the leadership of Juan José de Aycinena Piñol the conservatives aimed to regain their place as Guatemala's elite from which the liberals had expelled them. This is another example of Hybrid warfare in the 18th century.

The end of the Cold War created a unipolar system (with a preponderant American military power) and though this has tempered traditional conflicts, regional conflicts and threats that leverage the weaknesses of conventional military structure are becoming more frequent.

What is also new is the sophistication and lethality of non-state actors. These actors are well armed with technologically advanced weapons that are now available at low prices. Similarly, commercial technologies such as cell phones and digital networks are adapted to the battlefield. Another new element is the ability of non-state actors to persist within the modern system.

The Countries listed below are where the Hybrid Warfare that has taken place and covers the history of operation:²⁷

27. References to all the countries involved in hybrid warfare confronted with hybrid adversaries are - Hoffman, Frank (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 20-22.; Visoni-Alonzo, G., *The Carrera Revolt and "Hybrid Warfare" in Nineteenth Century Central America* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 2.; SWJ Editors (2008-01-27). "Training a "Hybrid" Warrior at the Infantry Officer Course". *Small Wars Journal*. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05; Hoffman, Frank (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 35-38.; Hoffman, Frank (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 38-39.; Schroefl, Joseph; Kaufman, Stuart. "Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War". *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 37 (10): 863.; Don't Be Fooled: Russia Attacked U.S. Troops in Syria: Mattis gave Putin "plausible deniability" for a military assault that went badly awry. Bloomberg, 16 February 2018.; Berzins, J. (2019). "Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare". in Howard, G. and Czekaj, M. (Eds.) *Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine*. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation.; *Russia v the West: Is this a new Cold War?* BBC, 1 April 2018.; Thornton, Rod (4 September 2015). "The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare". *The RUSI Journal*. 160 (4): 40-48. doi:10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047.; "REMARKS BY FOREIGN MINISTER SERGEY LAVROV AT THE XXII ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY". 2014-11-25. Retrieved 2017-02-02.; Carden, James. "Russia and America's Dangerous Dance". *The National Interest*. Retrieved 19 February 2017.; "E.U. Suspects Russian Agenda in Migrants' Shifting Arctic Route". *New York Times*. 2016-04-02. Retrieved 2016-04-02.; "The Strategic Threat from Iranian Hybrid Warfare in the Gulf". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. 13 June 2019.; "The Iran crisis will show Russia and China the West still has no answer for 'hybrid warfare'". *The Daily Telegraph*. 13 July 2019.; "Has Iran chosen hybrid warfare?". *The Hill*. 14 June 2019.; "Drone' attack on Saudis destabilises an already volatile region". *BBC News*. 16 September 2019.; "The necessity of "effective reaction" against U.S. hybrid war". *Tehran Times*. 22 June 2019.; "The current crisis in the Persian Gulf in the context of hybrid warfare". *Australian Defence Force Journal*. 2018.; "China's Hybrid Warfare and Taiwan". *The Diplomat*. 13 January 2018.; "Hybrid Warriors: China's Unmanned, Guerrilla-Style Warfare in Asia's Littorals". *The Diplomat*. 16 February 2017.; "Pakistan faces hybrid warfare' - Pakistan". *Dawn*. 9 March 2019.; "Hybrid Warfare in Pakistan - I". *Daily Times*. 2 July 2019.

2006 Israel-Hezbollah War

One of the most often quoted examples of a hybrid war is the 2006 conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah. The Hezbollah is a sophisticated non-state actor sponsored by Iran.²⁸ While the group often acts as a proxy for Iran, it has its own agenda. It was Hezbollah policy, rather than Iran's, that led to the kidnapping of Israeli troops that was the impetus for the war. The war featured about 3,000 Hezbollah fighters embedded in the local population attacked by about 30,000 Israeli regular troops.

The group used decentralized cells composed of guerrillas and regular troops armed with weaponry that nation states use such as anti-tank missiles, rockets, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced improvised explosive devices. Hezbollah cells downed Israeli helicopters, damaged Merkava IV tanks, communicated with encrypted cell phones, and monitored Israeli troops movements with night vision and thermal imaging devices. Iranian Quds Force operatives acted as mentors and suppliers of advanced systems.

Hezbollah leveraged mass communication immediately distributing battlefield photos and videos dominating the perception battle throughout the conflict. Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield but lost the information battle as the overwhelming perception at the time was of Israeli defeat.

2014 ISIL Advance into Iraq

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a non-state actor utilizing hybrid tactics against the conventional Iraqi military. ISIL has transitional aspirations, and uses irregular and regular tactics and terrorism. In response, the state of Iraq itself turned to hybrid tactics utilizing non-state and international actors to counter the ISIL advance. The United States likewise is a hybrid participant through a combination of traditional air power, advisers to Iraqi government troops, Kurdish peshmerga, and sectarian militias, and training opposition

28. Hezbollah was founded in the early 1980s as part of an Iranian effort to aggregate a variety of militant Lebanese Shia groups into a unified organization. Hezbollah acts as a proxy for Iran in the ongoing Iran-Israel proxy conflict. Hezbollah is generally considered the most powerful non-state actor in the world, and to be stronger than the Lebanese Army. A hybrid force, the group maintains "robust conventional and unconventional military capabilities." The party's fighting strength has grown substantially since the 2006 Lebanon War. As of 2018, annual Iranian monetary support for Hezbollah is estimated at 700 million dollars according to US estimates. Hezbollah officials have stated their aim is to defend Lebanon and Syria from takfiris, a term they use to denote Sunni Islamist forces, but which many Sunnis interpret as a slur against them as a whole, Islamist or non-Islamist.

forces within Syria. The Iraq-Syria hybrid war is a conflict with an interconnected group of state and non-state actors pursuing overlapping goals and a weak local state.

Russian Activities in the 2010s

Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014-present), Russo-Georgian War, Tajikistani Civil War, Transnistria War, Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, Russia-European Union relations Allegations of Russian intimidation and destabilisation of EU states, and Cyberwarfare by Russia.

The Russian government's wide use in conflicts such as in Syria and in Ukraine, of private military contractors such as those of the Wagner Group was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance her interests, while obfuscating her involvement and role.

In respect of Russia, Jānis Bērziņš, director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research, has widely published arguing that using the term Hybrid to characterize the Russian strategy is misleading, since the Russian have their own definitions and concepts. Accordingly, to him, "the word "hybrid" is catchy since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to the former being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Moreover, the concept of New Generation Warfare includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define it." Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at CNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, noted in March 2018 that the West's frequent references to hybrid warfare was in effect "an unintelligible Western reaction, after decades of wars of choice against paltry adversaries, to confrontation with another power that is capable across the full spectrum of conflict".

Russia on US activities : Cyberwarfare in the United States, United States intelligence operations abroad, United States involvement in regime change, and Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Moscow has accused Washington of conducting hybrid warfare against Russia during the colour revolutions. Its perception of being at war or in a 'permanent state of conflict' with the US and its allies were furthered by the 2014 Maidan uprising in Ukraine. Russia's activities in former Soviet states have been described as Hobbesian and redolent of Cold War thinking.


Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November 2014, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said:

"It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy - it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?"

United States on Russian Activities

European migrant crisis

General Philip Breedlove, in a US Senate hearing February 2016, claimed that Russia is using refugees to weaken Europe, directing the influx of refugees in the continent to destabilize areas and regions in terms of economy and to create social unrest. On 10 February 2016, Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö told a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers that Finland expects Russia to open a second front, where as many as 1 million migrants may arrive over the Finnish/Russian border. A similar statement was made by Ilkka Kanerva, Finland's former foreign minister and now chairman of the country's parliamentary Defense Committee.



Iranian Activities

Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict, Iran-Israel proxy conflict, Iran and state-sponsored terrorism, 2019 Persian Gulf crisis, and Cyberwarfare in Iran

Iran has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare. According to BBC, "Iran, along with its Houthi allies [in Yemen], is conducting a classic war of the weak against the strong; a "hybrid conflict" as it is known in



	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Major proxy conflict locations
Date	11 February 1979 – present ^{[45][46]} (40 years, 9 months and 6 days)		
Location	Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia		
Status	Ongoing:		

the strategic textbooks. It is borrowing many of the tactics from the Russian play-book - the use of deniability; proxies; cyber-operations and information warfare."

Iran on United States Activities

Iran-United States relations, Timber Sycamore²⁹, and United States sanctions against Iran (<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>)³⁰ are indicative of US Hybrid warfare activities.

The United States has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Iran and other countries.

Saudi and Emirati Activities

2017-2019 Qatar diplomatic crisis and Saudi Arabia and state-sponsored terrorism Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Qatar.

29. Operation "Timber Sycamore", initiated by President Barack Obama was privatized a little before the election of President Donald Trump. It is now coordinated by the investment fund KKR (established by Henry Kravis and whose military activities are led by the former head of the CIA, General David Petraeus). "Timber Sycamore" is the most important arms trafficking operation in History. It involves at least 17 governments. The transfer of weapons, meant for jihadist organizations, is carried out by Silk Way Airlines, a Azerbaïdjan public company of cargo planes. In the week 27 November - 2 December 2018, eight of this company's cargo planes landed at Aden (Yemen), Erbil and Bagdad (Iraq), Beirut (Lebanon), Djibouti (Djibouti), Kabul and Bagram (Afghanistan) and Tripoli (Libya). Furthermore, the transport of personnel between Djibouti and Aden was carried out by Taquan Air which was up till now a small US company working exclusively for business trips or tourism in Alaska. <https://syria360.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/cia-operationtimber-sycamore-continues/>

30. Overview and Objectives

Sanctions have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, a U.S. ally. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. After the mid-2000s, U.S. and international sanctions focused largely on ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is for purely civilian uses. During 2010-2015, the international community cooperated closely with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized sanctions regime in pursuit of the goal of persuading Iran to agree to limits to its nuclear program. Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously.

This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS has no way to independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks implementation of the various U.S. laws and executive orders. Some sanctions require the blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities, but no information has been released from the executive branch indicating the extent, if any, to which any such property has been blocked.

Chinese Activities

Chinese cyberwarfare³¹, Criticism of Confucius Institutes³², and 50 Cent Party³³.

China has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.

South Asian activities

Since the 1947, India and Pakistan have been involved in a number of wars, conflicts and military stand-offs. The Kashmir issue and cross border terrorism have been the cause of conflicts between the two countries mostly with the exception of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 where conflict originated due to turmoil in erstwhile East Pakistan now Bangladesh. However, during 1971 campaign, Mukti Bahini, an armed organization comprising of regulars and irregulars wherein regulars were defectors from East Pakistani units were employed by India in Bangladesh and it greatly assisted in achieving its political and military aims.

In the specific context of Pakistan³⁴, it has since its creation post-independence and partition treated India as its primary threat and enemy (ref). Due to its inadequacy vis-à-vis India with regards to military and financial capability, it has historically exhibited its overdependence on irregulars and hybrid warfare. It employed them in 1947-48 to seize portion of J&K, with battle for Srinagar by regular and irregular forces being a classical example. In 1965, Razakars were employed by Pakistan as part of carefully crafted strategy manifesting in form of Op Gibraltar in hill sector. During Kargil misadventure in 1999, Pakistan employed a mix of terrorists and regular troops to occupy critical heights along the Line of Control (LoC). The unfolding of Op TOPAC over last three decades with the aim to bleed India through a thousand cuts is also a typical manifestation of hybrid strategy adopted by Pakistan.

31. See P K Chakravorty, Hybrid Warfare in the Sino-Indian Context, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2019.

32. In April 2007, the first research-based Confucius Institute opened in Waseda University in Japan. In partnership with Peking University, the program promotes research activities of graduate students studying Chinese. As of 2014, there were over 480 Confucius Institutes in dozens of countries on six continents. See Congressional Report On Confucius Institutes at <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696910.pdf>.

33. See How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument (50 Cent Party) <https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf>

34. Quoted from Pradeep Semwal, Contextualizing and Understanding Hybrid Warfare by Pakistan, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2019, pp., 112-113.

Pakistan trained and inducted 80,000 Afghan Mujahidin's for collapse of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Its hand is seen in all terrorist actions perpetrated against India which include aid and abetment to the Sikh insurgency in Punjab; aid to United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) movement in Assam; the ongoing virulent insurgency in Kashmir; cross border infiltration; terrorist attacks in Indian cities; attack on Indian Parliament; plane hijacking; attack across the LoC at Kargil; fake currency racket through Nepal; "Karachi project" to train Indian Mujahidin for committing acts of terror and sabotage in India; the 26/11 attack in Mumbai in 2008; attack on Indian Embassy in Afghanistan; Uri and Pulwama attacks. All these incidents establish the capability of the adversary to conduct intermittent acts of violence, sabotage and subversion at will against India. India has also been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Pakistan.

Hybrid Warfare Ontology³⁵

The hybrid war as a form of Russia's aggressive solution to its geopolitical issues continues developing in every possible way, becomes more and more sophisticated and spreads out to the new battlegrounds. Nowadays we are witnessing at least three ongoing large-scale "hybrid" operations, each of which represents different possible types of "hybrid wars" activities: traditional military operation in Syria (Turkey), nonmilitary activity in the EU and the mix of all three types in Ukraine. The background, threats and possible consequences of every war line are given. It is shown that Ukraine's conflict is neither the beginning nor the finishing part and belongs to the much larger Russia's plan on the worldwide "hybrid warfare" operation.

Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory³⁶

Strategic theory is a depiction of the eternal principles of strategy, which has a literature centuries long. There are indeed very few things that haven't been discussed in the history of strategic theory. Looking through strategic theory, we can keep ourselves from rediscovering old ideas. It provides us with an unbiased approach to modern warfare.

35. See APPENDIX - A for the excellent research Article on the Hybrid Warfare Ontology.

36. See Appendix - B for a complete exposition on Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory

Hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept and strategic theory provides a robust viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. In fact, there is only one war with some more or less active warfare. What is required is to have a holistic vision of the strategic context and the adaptability to meet unique challenges of the day through the use of all instruments of grand strategy. Given that every challenge is unique in many important details, whether it is regular, irregular, or hybrid, they must be approached as political challenges in the first instance, then as grand strategic challenges. If it is decided that the challenge requires a military reaction, then grand strategy must employ the military instrument tailored against that specific challenge. One should note that it may not require a purely military option. As we have been experienced in Russia's hybrid warfare, the categorization encourages tactical thinking focused upon enemy's fighting methods, rather than upon strategic effectiveness in the conflict as a whole. As Renz pointed out, we oversimplify Russian Foreign Policy by narrowing down our vision to hybrid theory. The hybrid concept becomes counter-productive to strategy. Former Danish Chief of Defence, General Knud Bartels, who presided over the NATO Military Committee between 2012-2015, had experienced Crimea crisis first-hand as the Chairman in 2014. His words are a good summary of the main theme.

"Hybrid warfare is a fancy term to name what we have always known as "war". Life is very complicated and many of our nations love simple clear-cut definitions when they face complicated issues. War is war that you can conduct in many different ways. It doesn't always need to be main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, mechanized infantry, frigates, destroyer, aircraft carriers etc. It can also be subversive operations. But war has no purpose other than to achieve a political goal. Hybrid warfare is just a way of fighting a war which has a political purpose... It doesn't change the fact that as military personnel, in our commands, we make an assessment, we try to understand our adversary, we try to find what are his strong sides, what are his weak sides, and we try of course to focus on the weak sides and to shield off his strong sides. Military strategy is how you are going to fight the war, operations is how you want to fight the battle and tactics is how you fight in the battle. When I define how I want to fight war that's where, as a military commander, I will make a decision whether I want to use hybrid warfare or not. It's very relevant to study hybrid warfare now, but to elevate it as a new type of warfare, that's wrong."

Contextualising Hybrid Threats to India

Contextualising hybrid threats to India has a direct relationship to India's national security* and its political philosophy*. An indeapth study of the problems related to the cultural and civilization.al aspects of India's national security calls for truly multidimensional perspective. Many components of social science disciplines must come together for the formation of an integrated theoretical orientation. The problem of national security for a country like India which has experienced a series of catastrophes from within* and a continuing threat from without* has to be formulated in terms of the larger goals and aspiration to which this civilizational community has committed itself. Briefly, we may think of three such objectives namely: a) National stability and integrity ; b) Cultural, Social, Political and Economic aspiration and compulsions and c) Peace and stability in our relations with other states whenever possible

The problem of national security for a country, therefore, must be seen in terms of these larger goals*. If this may be called the cultural dimension of the problems of national security, we also have to look at the problem from the political perspective as well. Here we have to consider a complex interaction between our perceptions of our neighbors* beyond the borders as well as those of the larger major powers* including their objectives. This must necessarily also include the remaining superpower. It is within this matrix of relationships that the specific goals of our security policy towards the doctrine to contain the hybrid threats that India has to confront in the 21st Century will get structured.

The cultural and the political aspects of the problem create a texture of task and priorities of decision-making and the possible options for actions. The actualization of our objectives as modulated and structured requires an adequate process of institutionalization ranging from the economic to the administrative and the legal. The institutionalization of our national security efforts* themselves creates further problems and difficulties. Hence all the three dimensions viz. the cultural, socio-political and institutional enter in a complex interaction calling for skills and patterns of leadership at all levels of the problems. Therefore we need to arrive at multiple dimensions of leadership. This calls for ceative response to the complexities of the problem. In this whole endavour the role of the social scientists become seminal. A clear articulation of various facets of the suituation, their complex relationaship and also the sharp awareness of the possible contributions, tensions and pressures that must be overcome . Hence the contribution of scholars in the cultural and philosophical disciplines is vital for examining not only the normative aspects of the problems of security but also towards the

cumulative effects of hybrid threats that India has been facing since 1947 and hence actions needed to neutralise them in the light of ideals to which we are committed, i.e., national security, social justice and global peace.

We have observed earlier that India has been accused of conducting Hybrid warfare against Pakistan* without considering the fact that Pakistan has been the prime player to cause serious and continuous hybrid threat to India since 1947*. These threats and actions undertaken by Pakistan which began in the form of active use of irregular forces to occupy the Jammu and Kashmir region in 1947, resulting in the Indian Army to fight a war. Pakistan did not stop its efforts thereafter and fermented secessionism, separatism and terrorism in the entire Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan also precipitated two major wars between the two countries in 1965 and 1971, and a near war in Kargil in 1999, and continued to sponsor terrorism* by inducting Jehadi element of different denomination. It reached a serious level when aided by the local separatist elements in Kashmir when it succeeded in almost carry out an ethnic cleansing* of the population in the Kashmir valley resulting in the mass exodus of Kashmiri Hindu population of nearly 4,00,000* people from the valley into Jammu region. This has resulted in Kashmir as the only region in India which has today an absolute majority muslim population* and where the property abandoned* by the Kashmiri Hindus has been taken over by their Muslim neighbours. Pakistan has thus created a situation since 1991, when a section of the original inhabitants of the Kashmir have become refugees in their own country and still staying in refugee camps set up in Jammu and a sizeable number have had to migrate to the rest of the country for jobs and even education of their children. There is hardly an example of this nature occurring in the world except perhaps the Palestinian issue*. The effort to radicalise the population and even those working in government agencies has continued unabated resulting in India abrogating Article 370, putting under house arrest* all undesirable separatist elements including the political leaders, cut the internet and even telephone services since 5 August 2019, to stop the unabated terrorist activities and loss of life. These have resulted in hardly any casualties of human life in Kashmir since 5 Aug 2019*.

Similarly was the situation of Hybrid threat created by the influx of Rohingyas* as refugees from Myanmar who took shelter in Bangladesh and a sizeable number infiltrated across in India through Bangladesh plus a sizeable number of very poor Bangladeshi muslims taking advantage of the porous border between India and Bangladesh entered India over a period of two decades, acquire resident documents by unfair means* supported by vote bank politics of some Indian political parties. This has resulted in a hybrid threat in the absence of any document to support the citizenship profile of the individuals. India has had no other recourse but to take steps, act

and pass the Citizenship Amendment Act* and initiate the process of creating National Register for Citizen*. Needless to state that stern action envisaged by the Centre has created its own ramification to disturb the Centre State relationship in India internally.

Moreover, India has been experiencing hybrid threat from the age-old Naxal movement* in Chattisgarh area over the past three decades in an on off situation. Coupled with all this has been Pakistan China relationship* to undermine India's national and strategic interests and the role of China in India's North Eastern States* and on the international border between India and China which still remains unresolved after six decades and more. This even after 21 meetings* on border demarcation between India and China and on several occasions the two countries' regular forces coming eyeball to eyeball confrontation. So far India has responded to this vast array of hybrid threats in a reactive way till India decided to go on defensive offensive action against China and preemptive action against the terrorist activities in the form of surgical strikes* both in the Eastern and Western international borders of India. Hybrid threats to India will continue to remain even in the foreseeable future and if the theoretical assumptions that have been presented above are fully introspected, policies culled out of the recommendations given in the beginning of this study, then India will be well on the way to contain the destabilising and disruptive elements. It is not an easy way forward for India which apart from being the largest democracy has a complex mosaic of ethnic, religious, social and anthropological diversity to contend with unlike any other country in the world. Indian policy makers will be well advised to integrate the cultural and civilisational precondition with policy imperatives at normative and empirical levels for achieving a secure and stable nation state by securitising the social, political, human, economic and strategic aspects to emerge as a major power in amongst the comity of nations globally.

Conclusion

This is a referral research output. As we have noted in the very beginning that the purpose of this very compressed theoretical piece is to provide the future readers the conceptual and theoretical moorings of Hybrid Warfare. Adequate care has been taken to give extensive corroborating scholarly and policy oriented writings that have appeared not only in the post 2006 but also the linkage to previous works on the larger issue of War and Violence. The presentation is hence a referral research essay to aid Researchers and policy makers in their quest to understand the complexities that the Global system will face in the 21st Century.

With globalisation and information technology having taken quantum leap and now with the utilisation of cyber space and artificial intelligence, the spector of Hybrid warfare and Hybrid threats are there to stay in the international system. International relations amongst nation state and even the balance of power game will be deeply affected by the non-state actors. We have tabulated the observations and the policy recommendations at the very beginning and have added two seminal research papers on "Hybrid Warfare Ontology" and "Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory". It is hoped that the presentation along with its extensive corroborating references and appendices will help policy makers to undertake deeper studies and formulate national policies in this very important area.

Appendix A

УДК 355.01.1-651.1:327.5.061.1ЄС(470+571)+(477)

The "Hybrid Warfare" Ontology

Horbulin Volodymyr,*Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor,**Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine*

The hybrid war as a form of Russia's aggressive solution to its geopolitical issues continues developing in every possible way, becomes more and more sophisticated and spreads out to the new battlegrounds. Nowadays we are witnessing at least three ongoing large-scale "hybrid" operations, each of which represents different possible

types of "hybrid wars" activities: traditional military operation in Syria (Turkey), nonmilitary activity in the EU and the mix of all three types in Ukraine. The background, threats and possible consequences of every war line are given. It is shown that Ukraine's conflict is neither the beginning nor the finishing part and belongs to the

much larger Russia's plan on the worldwide "hybrid warfare" operation. Keywords: the hybrid warfare, Russia's aggression, the Syrian issue, non-military operation in the European Union, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, propaganda. Hybrid war: it's just the beginning...^[1]

In January 2015 we presented our opinion on the Russian aggression, its forms and geopolitical foundations. We also pointed out to the key steps Ukraine should take to cope with the consequences of the hybrid war^[2]. The eventful year 2015 did not only confirm our projections, but even deepened and strengthened the case for some of them. Moreover, we can state that the "hybrid warfare" as a form of Russia's aggressive solution to its geopolitical issues went beyond Ukraine. It continues developing in every possible way, becomes more and more sophisticated and spreads out to new battlegrounds. Thus, a kind of a prophecy, made by the President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė in 2014, is currently fulfilling:

"If a terrorist state that is engaged in open aggression against its neighbor is not stopped, then that aggression might spread further into Europe".^[3] Indeed, it has spread further. And it has

taken the most intricate forms. Hybrid warfare: first outcomes and new directions The preponderance of the hybrid warfare as Russia's primary method of warfare for the long years to come is also evident in the new General Gerasimov's article, entitled "On Syria's experience"^[4]. This is the very General Gerasimov who provided the first public articulation of Russia's vision of modern conflicts as the hybrid warfare in the beginning of 2013.

His new article is based on his conference speech at the Academy of Military Science on February 27, 2016. Gerasimov does not present any fundamentally new points there (as compared to his 2013 speech). Still, he very clearly outlines key priorities of the Russian vision of the hybrid warfare's goals (in this article hybrid war is referred to as "blitzkrieg of the 21st century"): "achieving political goals with minimal armed pressure on the enemy".^[4] However, in line with the Russian mainstream, Gerasimov attributes all this exclusively to "malevolent West." Here we are obviously dealing with the psychological phenomenon of "projection": attributing the opponent with one's own (negative) features. Gerasimov says that the goals of the "hybrid warfare" should be achieved through undermining enemy's military and economic potential, applying information and psychological pressure, actively supporting domestic opposition, using guerilla and diversionary methods^[4].

He also rightly notes that in contemporary world the ability of the armed forces to conduct quick and effective operation on any battleground, especially unconventional one, matters more than their size. This trend is further amplified by the quick rise of non-military methods of warfare: "the complex use of political, economic, information, and other non-military measures, which are implemented with reliance on military force".^[4] What is more, it is difficult to disagree with one of Gerasimov's key conclusions: "combination of the traditional and hybrid methods is already typical of every armed conflict. And while the latter can be used without explicit use of force, classic military operations can no longer be successful without hybrid ones".^[4] And indeed, Russia openly develops and implements similar approaches into practice and has no slightest intention to stop. Russia actively polishes this new type of aggression, manipulating its components, carefully (not always though) dosing them in each specific case and checking what and where works efficiently, making adjustments to the direction of the strike underway. Infact, Russia - for the first time in a while - managed to transform the limitations of its strategic culture (tactical sagacity combined with minimal strategic planning and predictions of the long-term consequences of actions) into a strategic advantage (since the objective of Russia on the global level is de-facto a "global anarchy", which Russia believes to be the desirable state of world geopolitical space). Today we can identify several key components that correlate to the activities pursued within the

framework of "hybrid wars" in current Russian practice, which can be further combined into three large groups.

1. Traditional military means (use of regular military units and weapons as well as special operations forces).
2. Quasi-military activities (creation and support of illegal armed groups, support and radicalization of separatist movements, formal and informal private military companies).
3. Operations of non-military influence, especially in terms of special information operations and "active measures" (including economic pressure, operations in cyberspace, diplomacy, manipulating information space).

Within those three groups Russia adjusts its actions to apply hybrid attack techniques to specific countries or regions. In each specific case at different stages a particular group is preferred, which depends on current military, political and economic situation. Moreover, Russia succeeds in consciously (or rather unconsciously) achieving synergetic effect in different areas of hybrid confrontation intensifying certain forms of hybrid warfare in other arenas. However, as it was repeatedly said by various experts, there is nothing fundamentally new in each particular element of a hybrid war. In fact, the rather new is an elaborate interrelation of all used asymmetric methods and the intensity of their use to achieve strategic goals. Nowadays we are witnessing at least three ongoing large-scale "hybrid" operations, which are very similar despite a certain difference in external representation: Syria (Turkey), the European Union, Ukraine.

The "Hybrid Warfare" Ontology

Стратегічні пріоритети, № 1 (38), 2016 р.

The hybrid context of the Syrian knot: prevalence of the military component Due to Russia's intervention, the Syrian conflict - much alike the Ukrainian one - has entered a lengthy phase of sluggish negotiations. Given quite a tentative nature of deliverables following the negotiations between the US and Russia (similarly to Ukraine, the ceasefire regime in Syria is rather fictitious), the task for Russia remains the same as the one in Ukraine - to "freeze" the conflict if Moscow is unable to benefit from its solution. Russia's interference into the Syrian conflict that lasted since 2011 was not sudden, but drastic and systematic. Nevertheless, in

contrast to the aggression against Ukraine, Russia openly and immediately started to use its armed forces (aircraft, missiles). It is plausible that it is a result of scrutinizing the Russia's actions in Ukraine. After all, on March 1, 2014 Ukraine's ex-president Yanukovich, who had already been hiding in Russia at that time, addressed Putin with a request to intervene on Ukraine's territory^[5]. At that time Russia did not carry out direct invasion, entrusting paramilitary units with the role of vanguard instead. As a result, Russia is still compelled to officially conceal and deny its military presence in the east of Ukraine. It seems that a decision was taken to exercise different approach in Syria - declaring Russian presence right away. Generally, the Syrian campaign was based on the use of conventional weapons and special forces troops. However, Russia did not fully abandon the use of "militia" and Russian "little green men" - private military companies. What is more, mercenaries

for Syria were recruited among those fighting for "DPR" and "LPR" with a promise of higher salary, official status and advantages of being a "liberator of the Syrian people". Information (non-military) component has been virtually absent in Syria (due to the specifics of military and political background). Still that was not the case of so-called "active measures." Especially, while the Russian intelligence units are ever-present in Syria in large numbers and experts are making intelligent judgments regarding ties between the Russian special forces and ISIS militants. Therefore, in Syria Russia has de facto accomplished what can be described as an almost perfect "hybrid operation": a number of certain positive results for the present Russian foreign policy were achieved at a minimal (military) cost. At the same time, the Syrian campaign is not only the operation either to cover Russia's own mistakes in other arenas (e. g. in Ukraine), obtain additional foreign policy bargaining chips or consolidate its positions in the Middle East (what seemed a bit problematic after Qaddafi's fall and a series of "Arab Spring" revolutions), but also a demonstration of the Russian Federation armed forces' readiness to perform operations on the distant war theaters. In sum, Russia has quite actively started renewing the discourse of the Cold War: mainly, by permanent provocations by its armed forces all around the world. First of all, with its submarines (incidents with the Russian submarines in the waters of Sweden, the US, the UK, and France could be mentioned here) and aircraft (in 2015 only, NATO fighters accompanied more than 60 Russian aircrafts, the Russian aviation permanently appeared "by a mistake" over territory of other states). This will periodically cause incidents similar to that with the SU-24 downed by Turkey, but generally, it will provoke accumulation of uncertainty and anxiety in the international security sphere. Russia has transformed its "hybrid" war method from a testing mode to a daily (technological) level, which is proven by its reaction to the downed aircraft and the decision to escalate

carefully but toughly the confrontation with the Turkish leadership. The whole set of pressure measures was implemented very soon that proved either it had been prepared in advance or it represented an established technique (these included introducing of quite extensive economic sanctions, provoking the Turkish armed forces by permanent Turkey's airspace violations, making statements to support Kurds, etc.).

And it seems that Europe becomes an arena for Russia's new showcase operation (similar to the Crimean scenario). Full-scale non-military operation in the EU: to provoke as much hate and confusion as possible. The second hybrid operation is being carried out within the EU. Despite the fact that some experts predict an imminent large-scale war for the Eastern Europe and the whole world, its probability is still low.

Nevertheless, the Baltic States have reasonable grounds to fear a "hybrid threat" from Russia and they treat this threat rationally, taking preventive measures and learning from the Ukrainian experience. "The migrant crisis", caused by a huge amount of the Middle East refugees expelled by the Syrian war moving in the European direction, put the European capitals into a complicated situation and diverted their attention from other problems for a long time. In particular, this is due to the fact that this crisis, having allegedly external roots, has produced a whole series of much deeper internal crises. These include tough debates about internal and external borders, about who should settle refugees and in what manner, what to do with them in the future, how shall the EU react to the crisis in general (by strengthening unity on the common values ground or via isolationism). All this has sparked the rise of radical nationalistic groups and parties, which are already converting the crisis into political dividends. About half a year into the crisis, experts of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence openly point out that Russia is behind the migrant crisis (or being more precise, behind orchestrating crisis radicalization using right-wing organizations and various Russian "compatriots"): "Russia is establishing a network that can be controlled. You can use it as they have tried to do in Germany, combined with the legitimate issue of refugees, to undercut political processes in a very serious way... They are using Russian speakers, social media, trying to build on the existing fault lines. Use the far right narrative and exploit that." This issue became so urgent that according to media German Government officially assigned the German intelligence and counter-espionage agencies to analyze whether Russia uses so called "active measures" against Germany. In this regard, it is hard not to notice Russia's cumulative exploitation of the "migration crisis" potential for its own purpose, which is visible at all stages and levels. Meanwhile, the very fact of Russia's active airstrikes of north Syria bolsters migrant flows to Europe. Already in March 2016

General Breedlove connected airstrikes and ground campaign in Syria with growing intensity of migration to the EU in one logical chain. Meanwhile, in Europe itself Russia effectively promotes xenophobic attitudes by using its media and proxy radical political parties and groups (financially controlled), many of which were created deliberately for intensifying this crisis (this looks very plausible in the case of NGO "Donetsk Republic", created already in 2005 by one of the current "DPR" leaders - A. Purgin). The most vivid example of this smooth interplay (orchestrated by Moscow) between the "anti-European International" members was the case of "girl Liza" in Germany, which even caused international scandal and harsh remarks of the German Foreign Minister addressed to S. Lavrov. In general, the issue of "anti-European International" created by the Kremlin within the EU is steadily rising to the top of the agenda of the European capitals. An official report on the this process by the Czech anti-espionage agency Security and Information Service comments it in the following way: "Russia creates the ideological structure in Europe, which could be recognized by the whole European political establishment - from the left extremists via populists to right wing extremists, which is considered to be the turn to the COMINTERN concept, created and coordinated by the Soviet Union".^[6] The validity of abovementioned assessment is strongly supported by the Ukrainian journalists' investigation regarding the Czech President M. Zeman and his close circle.

There are plenty of similar cases - from multiple instances of providing loans for the political activity of the French "National Front" to direct accusations of the members of Hungarian political party "Jobbik" on espionage on behalf of Russia. And this list is much longer. According to different assessments, the political projects (either certain politicians or experts), who act in favor of the Russia's foreign policy, are active in at least the ten EU member states. And most of these European states are quite important: besides the already mentioned France, Germany, and the Czech Republic, they also include Austria, Hungary, Greece, Italy and a few others. What is revealing about members of this "International" (representing mostly far-right parties, though not exclusively as there is also a fairly large number of groups that have nothing to do with radicalism) is that they demonstrate similar "troglodyte" approach to the fundamental European concepts (like "political responsibility" or "political culture"), as do their Kremlin curators in their internal political process. Even direct accusations of getting funds from Moscow not only fail to render their leaders politically dead, but also even make extra-promotion of their public profile. Of no lesser scale were the actions of the same "International" (or groups of "useful idiots") regarding the initiative to hold a referendum on the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in the Netherlands. Although it would be more appropriate to state that the Dutch were being used "in the dark", which is characteristic of the

"active measures" practices. The Dutch example is also demonstrative because of its danger for Europe from a strategic point of view, since Russia used strictly internal (referendum), legitimate mechanisms (including those of financial nature) for the achievement of its foreign policy goals. If this goes on, the entire internal social and political system logic might as well be discredited. However, this corresponds to the general Russian "hybrid" approach: using internal mechanisms and rhetoric of the West for its own destruction. Earlier, the same kind of attack was launched along the lines of "freedom of speech" when, while appealing to the traditional values of freedom of speech, the Russian media ("Russia Today" in the first place) actively manipulated information while portraying such manipulations as "an alternative point of view". Sometimes, the political correctness of Europe in this area results in grotesque situations. One such recent example provided the participation of the representatives of a purely propagandist TV channel "Zvezda" (The Star) affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation at the OSCE "Propaganda for Hatred and Freedom of the Media" conference^[7]. When speaking about using (or rather indulging in some domestic developments) of legal mechanisms, which could lead to the collapse of the EU, one cannot but mention the situation related to the Great Britain and its Brexit referendum on the issue of exit from the European Union. Incited by the Russian propagandist forces (both media and political), the Great Britain became deeply divided on this issue and the idea "to exit the EU" suddenly transformed from a marginal one to the mainstream. The outcome is yet to be seen on June 23. In the meanwhile, in case of positive vote on Brexit, the situation will develop further: experts predict (or, in fact, even speak of it as inevitable) a referendum on independence of Scotland, intensified confrontation over the status of the Northern Ireland, and the need for the EU to revise many of its approaches (including those related to security and regional economics). British journalists put it straight that the only winner of "yes" in the Brexit referendum will be Vladimir Putin who, as pointedly remarked by a British journalist, is "stress testing the European Union".^[8] One cannot say that such Russia's activities are fully ignored by the EU. For example, strategic communication units have been put in place and partially started to function within both the EU and NATO. However, this response appears to be rather reactive (e.g. dismissing the lies of the Russian media or conducting general studies of the current Russian narrative)

The situation with possible proactive approaches is still ambiguous. In the meanwhile, Russia's activities amplify internal political tensions, aggravate economic problems and strengthen the influence of domestic destructive opposition in the EU. All combined, these are what Gerasimov has proclaimed to be the purposes of a "hybrid warfare". Russia's goal in

Europe was recently precisely described by James Sherr. According to him, the West does not doubt, it knows that Russia is going through economic difficulties in different spheres. Understandably, this cannot last a long time and the Russians are willing to find a handsome way out. But why they don't stop shooting? For Sherr the answer is pretty obvious - because the Russians understand that the West is as weak politically as Russia is economically. They believe that political variable is decisive and that unity of the West, at least in its current form, is unstable and not lasting. Hence, if they win the political battle, all other issues, including related to the economy, will get settled as well. Sherr does not argue that they are right, but he believes this is how the situation is perceived in the Kremlin^[9]. Still the question is much more acute: will Russia be able to destroy not only the European political solidarity on certain issues, but also the European structure as a whole? Unless counter measures are taken, it is quite possible that the answer is "yes". Until recently, unfortunately, Europe has not been able to muster the strength to address this threat in a comprehensive manner (as shown by local elections in Germany where representatives of the Alternative for Germany party, which is linked to the Kremlin, were able to gain seats in some local parliaments). And the problem is not that the attacks come from a variety of directions and they are difficult to counter. The problem is rather that Europe (or at least a significant part of it) has not yet fully realized that the new geopolitical reality where "peace" is not an equivalent to the "there-is no-shooting" state-of-play. The destructive hybrid activity of Russia blurs the boundaries between "peace" and "war". A specter of a "Cold War", in its new shape, has not only come to the EU border, but also has been very much active there, something the Europeans prefer not to notice. Or rather they are not ready to change their understanding of the reality in order to respond adequately to the obvious challenge. NATO's attempts to tackle this issue have been more successful, although still not sufficient. Ukraine: two years of countering hybrid warfare.

For more than two years already, Ukraine has been countering the Russian terrorist forces and Russia's massive aggression in the form of "hybrid warfare." In this timespan we have faced, probably, all its manifestations outlined at the beginning of this article: direct military aggression, use of subversive and reconnaissance groups, attacks of quasi-military structures (such as "militia" and "Cossacks"), constant incitement of separatist movements across all of Ukraine, economic pressure (through imposing of sanctions and phytosanitary control, demanding the payback of a USD 3 bln. loan issued to the Yanukovych regime, smuggling of the remaining industrial complex facilities from the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts into the territory of the Russian Federation), diplomatic pressure on all levels (local, regional, and international), permanent information and psychological warfare, and

finally, probably the first in the world successful cyber-attack against an object of critical infrastructure (the Prykarpattiaoblenergo regional power distribution company). One should not forget that the aggression became possible not only because Russia was physically capable of launching it. The weak reaction of the West to the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 gave rise to the sense of permissiveness and impunity in the minds of the Russian leaders.

Although, when one speaks about Russia's hybrid warfare against Ukraine, it often appears overlooked that the aggression has been launched by a nuclear nation that reminds, every now and then, about its nuclear status to the rest of the world. Besides, it is hard to ignore a purely numerical superiority of the Russian Federation over Ukraine in both live force and weapons. The goals of the Russian Federation regarding

Ukraine, by all and large, have changed little last two years (in fact, this period is longer). They still comprise the same task of creating a territorial entity uncontrolled by the Ukrainian government inside Ukraine, general destabilization of the social and political situation, economic exhaustion of Ukraine, redirecting the Ukrainian resources from current issues, and blocking the European integration processes^[10]. Despite all this, Ukraine persists in actively countering the aggression. This does not mean any reduction of threats from the Russian Federation, though.

The direct military aggression remains to be a real and tangible threat for Ukraine (possibly, for many Eastern European nations as well). It is worth mentioning that we, like our Western partners, with stubbornness better applied elsewhere, often continue to underestimate the changes that have taken place as a result of the so-called Serdyukov's reform. All the related scandals notwithstanding, many experts agree that the reform carried out by Serdyukov was the most encompassing one in the Russian armed forces since 1930's. First of all (according to Gerasimov), there has been a gradual shift from a massive conscript army to high levels of permanent combat readiness of units and improvement of interoperability of forces. For instance, 23 cumbersome divisions have been replaced with 40 more maneuverable brigades capable of acting independently. A significant step has been made to get rid of the so-called "paper" units, staffed with career officers only serving with warehouses of unused weapons and military equipment. Combating that, a shift towards full-staff units has occurred. Efforts to create a contract army become more targeted, since it is impossible to train conscripts to adequately use the increasingly sophisticated military equipment, specifically in the context of rearmament plans of the Russia's "State Armaments Program 2020". The Russians have also improved the interoperability of their forces through the creation of five strategic commands

allowing for better control by field commanders of all groups of forces within their area of responsibility. Minister Shoigu has only consolidated these changes. Drastic improvements in military training and rapidly increased frequency of exercises have been probably the most important achievements of the new Russia's defense minister. When speaking about the exercises, one should remember that those are snap exercises and not show-exercises that are held with a half year advance notice. In this way, combat-like conditions for the exercises are created.

To summarize these changes, we can refer to the opinion of experts of the European Council on Foreign Relations: "For the first time, the Russian army had a pyramid structure, with few decision-makers at the top and more officers servicing the troops... While such high readiness levels have not yet been achieved, one has to bear in mind that before the reforms some Russian divisions needed about a year of preparation before deploying to Chechnya. Outstanding success of this reform could be illustrated by the following: Moscow was able to maintain thousands of fully equipped troops at a constant state of readiness near the Russian-Ukrainian border for several months and simultaneously conduct military exercises with participation of 80 thousand of troops in other parts of the country. Several important aspects withhold these transformations and give us time to find solutions and increase our defense capability:

- rampant corruption (one might even say "state creating" corruption, as in Stanislaw Lem's artificial state of Lamblia). It is impossible to overcome it in modern Russia, because it is cementing the foundation of the current political regime.
- demographic crisis, which complicates any form (contract or enlistment) of new soldiers' recruitment (which might lead to considering the need to reduce the sheer number of troops)¹¹
- ambitions of political and military leadership that do not always correspond to real economic capabilities of the state (this leads to various megalomaniac projects, whose number, however, is steadily decreasing). However, these constraining elements should not spur the deceptive calm. The Russian army is not just the crowd of "cannon fodder" as some "experts" try to depict. It is the force which has to be taken into account and we must be ready to face it on the battlefield. Therefore, the development of defense and security sector, defense industry is an objective long-term priority for the country, regardless of the current political situation. Besides, Russia does not give up hopes to forge a kind of an

"army" using personnel of the "DPR" and "LPR", based on the Russian model. The Southern District Command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Reserve, which has been created to perform this task, works on that. Major command and staff positions in such a "military" corps have been occupied by the Russian officers. Up to 40 % of the ranks of these armies are the inhabitants of the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Altogether, it allows Russia to keep forces sufficient to start offensive actions in the occupied territories. However, Russia is not going to rely only on its own Armed Forces and proxy pseudo-armies in pseudo-republics - from year to year Russia is increasingly active in using its own private military companies and will continue to increasingly expand the practice. Ukrainian experts provide quite a detailed description of the exploitation of various PMCs by Russia (under the guise of "security firms" or their analogues) in numerous "hot spots" - from Bosnia to Ukraine and Syria. The highest level of attention to this issue is corroborated by a discussion on this matter at a recent conference of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation on February 27, 2016. And, most likely, the pressure of these various PMCs on Ukraine will only grow as well as the activities of different sabotage-reconnaissance groups. But only Ukraine should expect increased activity of these structures on its territory - many of Russia's neighbors (formally - allies) may "accidentally" find themselves under attack. The attempts to influence Ukraine or the realization of the Ukrainian interests through diplomatic mechanisms continue unabated. At the UN level, Russia has reverted to the time-tested tactics of using the votes of some countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America in exchange for economic and military preferences. It is using BRICS and the SCO to demonstrate its emergence from international isolation. We should not also ignore the issues, which are painful for the West and could be affected by Russia - among them are presently Syria and ISIS. Although the West still preserves the unity on the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, ignoring the pressure of the Syrian question on this unity would have been short-sighted. As we have already noted, Ukraine on its own is in a unique situation - not only have we become the first country where a full-fledged (as previously it was tried in Georgia) new model of aggression has been tested by the Russian Federation. We were able to defend ourselves (sometimes - paying too high a price) and develop mechanisms to counteract the most aggressive hybrid attacks and at the same time to continue the positional fight against a much stronger enemy. Thus our experience is not just worthy of a closer look (it is already being explored by the structures of NATO and the certain Eastern European countries) - it is unique in terms of assessment of threats which the world (and particularly Europe) will have to deal with

very soon. In his last interview with *The Atlantic*, US President Barack Obama said frankly that "The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do".^[11] And it is important for understanding what our Western partners actually expect - the ability to defend ourselves on our own. Not to rely on "NATO forces", but to build efficient, modern and combat-ready armed forces that will be able to restrain the militaristic impulses of the northeastern neighbor. We should not entertain themselves with illusions that Russia will give up a new kind of warfare - almost the all-Russian military research efforts are aimed at its further development and specification. And, recognizing the Russia's ability to find successful local (but strategically wrong) decisions, it is necessary to understand that there are not only Ukraine and the Baltic States in the area of direct "hybrid threats", but also all the Russia's CSTO neighbors and Europe as a whole. As part of its "hybrid strategy" and a course towards anarchic global security environment, Russia could consciously resume a number of "frozen conflicts", particularly in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions. And this trend is now unfolding - Vladimir Putin has already expressed readiness to support Serbia in its position on Kosovo^[12].

For over 20 years we have ignored or preferred not to notice the permanent threat, and we cannot afford this attitude anymore. But were we only who "did not notice" it? It's hard to ignore the stubborn refusal of the leaders of key world powers to notice more and more pronounced signs of backsliding on democracy, capacity building, strengthening of authoritarian tendencies and (primarily geopolitical) revanchism in the Russian Federation. All this led to missing the point, when the actions of the Russian leadership became a serious threat to European and world security. Significantly, despite the constant "reforms" in key international security structures (OSCE and NATO) in 1990's and 2000's, none of them was sufficiently ready for action in the new conditions of hybrid warfare. Russia's hybrid operations are turning the whole area of international security to a single "risk zone." Thus, a situation is being created, when the hybrid aggression can be resolutely implemented against any country or group of countries (as exemplified in Russia's actions in the EU's informational and political space), including military (quasi-military) methods.

Returning to the Ukrainian context, it should be clearly understood: even if the fighting does not resume (or is not overarching as it was during the summer of 2014 - winter 2015), even if the Russian side fully implements the Minsk agreements and restores Ukraine's control over the border (which seems almost unbelievable at the moment) - even in this case hybrid warfare

will not stop and it will be transformed only partially. Even now it is clear that in addition to increasing informational pressure and transforming "DPR" - "LPR" into the lasting destabilize factor for the Ukrainian life, the Russian Federation uses the tactics of provoking radical events in Ukraine as well as in Europe. The most recent facts of detection of the Russian surveillance "embedded" into the ranks of the Ukrainian volunteer battalions and national-patriotic organizations indicate that Russia is ready to fight for Ukraine "to the last Ukrainian." And "active measures" by the Russian special services will only accrue. An illustrative case: the most ardent supporter of the so called "Third Maidan" protest movement, moderator of many pages in social networks, which urges Ukrainian patriots to "go out" and "fight against the regime of internal occupation" is the former separatist "militant", living in Russia. And the number of such cases is growing. Discussion on Donbas often overshadows the issue of Crimea. Meanwhile, the militarization of Crimea is in full swing, and quite unlikely that this is "for nothing" - Crimea might become another factor in escalation, which could be provoked by Russia quite deliberately and thoughtfully. Especially in a case, when the plans of strengthening military presence there will be fully implemented. Partial lull on the front should not provoke self-deceptive thoughts that "everything is over." We have got quite a nominal respite (including through constantly criticized the Minsk II) which we have to use for real economic reforms, improvement of the security and defense system and search of complex solutions to counter hybrid threats in the near future. Hybrid war did not start and will not end in Ukraine. It's just the beginning...

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Appendix - B

Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory

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Abstract

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it approaches hybrid warfare from the perspective of strategic theory, which assumes that all wars throughout history have shared certain common characteristics. Analysing the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory, this paper argues that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.

Keywords: *Strategy, Strategic theory, grand strategy, military strategy, hybrid warfare, military concept, military doctrine, buzzwords.*

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of new terms and concepts within the defence community regarding the search for an understanding of contemporary warfare. Analysts, scholars raced to assign labels such as "fourth-generation warfare", "compound wars", "asymmetric conflict", "revolution in military affairs (RMA)" etc. Some terms are adopted in the core documents of leading Western countries and international organisations, only to fade from use after a few years, even before they could understand the lessons learned. For this reason, such terms are often seen as buzzwords. "Hybrid warfare", the latest term of this kind to gain a place in the official documents of the EU and NATO, carries the risk of becoming another buzzword as critiques of the concept have begun to increase. It is understandable, even commendable, that analysts endeavour to grasp and

conceptualize contemporary warfare. The concepts shape our defence understanding, and thus our armed forces, doctrines and the way that armed forces fight. However, the opportunity cost of misconception is too high, as it creates confusion rather than clarity and obscures the strategic thought. The defence community clearly needs a litmus test for the validity of the terms that it has adopted.

Strategic theory, which assumes that all wars throughout history have shared certain common characteristics, could provide a valid viewpoint, if not a litmus test. This is because most of the concepts, doctrines or terms are rediscoveries of what has already been observed in the past. For instance, the "comprehensive approach", which was initially developed by the UK Ministry of Defence at the beginning of the 2000s and later recognized by all NATO members, is not different in its essence from "the grand strategy", which has been well known for more than a century. Interestingly, hybrid warfare, the next term to be adopted by NATO, which shares many common aspects with the grand strategy as well, has been compared increasingly with the comprehensive approach. A closer look on recently invented terms reveals that they tend to see the current problems as unique but fail to see historical continuities. They usually concentrate on some dimensions of strategy and suggest that the success can be gained through these particular dimensions. Strategic theory instead provides a holistic thinking that the defence community needs. As Milevski indicated, these attempts to categorize war usually discount the role of strategy which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare and it is only through strategy that the character of warfare takes shape.^[1]

This paper aims to analyse the "hybrid warfare" concept through the lens of strategic theory.

This paper aims to analyse the "hybrid warfare" concept through the lens of strategic theory. The hybrid warfare already has inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this study is unique in the sense that it approaches hybrid warfare from the perspective of strategic theory. The first part of the paper will discover the strategic theory and present a model. It is a challenge to summarise such a comprehensive theory in one part as it has a literature of more than a century. I would like to note that although this part reflects my own understanding from strategic theory, I benefited so much from Gray's thoughts as it is the most comprehensive one, in quest to theorize strategy with its all dimensions. The second part will present the hybrid warfare concept to describe its evolution, its definitions by various stakeholders and common critiques on the concept. Finally, the third part will analyse the hybrid concept through the lens of strategic theory, particularly through discussing the controversial themes about the concept and later providing a general assessment.

Strategy and Strategic Theory

Strategic theory, which assumes that all wars in history share certain common characteristics, provides a holistic viewpoint to examine warfare. It is useful in understanding the validity and soundness of emerging concepts, albeit it is too comprehensive to grasp at first glance. To Osinga, strategic theory comprises thoughts about making effective strategy.^[2] It is a system of interlocking concepts and principles pertained to strategy, which postulates that there exists a system of common attributes to all wars and that war belongs to a larger body of human relations and actions known as politics.^[3] It provides guidance on how to manage the complexities of using force to achieve policy ends.^[4] It is mind opening and it facilitates clarity of understanding as it is not linked to a particular historical context, which allows the strategist to extricate himself from situational bias.^[5] In one respect, all explanations relevant to strategy that shall be presented in the rest of this part constitute the strategic theory.

Before moving to the content, it is good to say that the strategy, hence the strategic theory, is an attempt to explain what has already been practiced throughout the history. It is a depiction of the universal and eternal features of strategy-making. Strategy, as a term we would understand today, was first utilised in 1770s^[6], however, as Gray noted, the basic logic of strategy is to be found in all places and periods of human history, regardless of which term was used by distinct societies or cultures. Strategy is unavoidable because human, the common denominator between the past and the future, always needs security and it is in his/her nature to behave politically and strategically against potential dangers.^[7]

Strategy is one word that is so widely used but hardly understood. It also became popular in many fields outside politics, such as economics and management. For Strachan, the term has acquired such universality that it has robbed it of meaning.^[8] Despite their vital importance to the security of any nation, policy and strategy are not well understood, hence widely confused by many officials even in key positions of the governments.^[9] Clausewitz provides a brilliant and very concise definition, -but narrow at the same time, "strategy is the use of the engagements for the purpose of the war."^[10] Building on this definition, Colin S. Gray defines strategy as "the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics".^[11] For Wylie, strategy is "a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end: a purpose together with system of measures for its accomplishment."^[12] Beatrice Heuser makes a similar definition with an emphasis on comprehensiveness and enemy's will. "Strategy is a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the

threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills."^[13] More definitions can be presented here as there are many, however, to keep it short, strategy can be summarised as the use of ways and means to achieve the desired ends, the link between policy and military. What is common in all definitions is its function of instrumentality.

Strategy is usually expressed by the magic formula of the retired U.S. Army Colonel Arthur Lykke. It consists of three simple phrases; policy ends, strategic ways, and military means (EWM) where policy end denotes the goals we aspire to get, strategic ways correspond to the alternative courses of action to follow, and military means are the resources that we could employ. Recently a fourth word, the assumption, was added to this construction. Since the strategy is a future-centric discipline and there are always unknowns about the future, planners have to make a presumption to enable their further planning. It is inevitable that the trinity (ends, ways, means) must be built upon some educated guess.

Built on the Clausewitzian definition of strategy, Lykke's architecture is a powerful construct to explain the essence of strategy in a concise manner. However, it is rather a mechanistic explanation which is far from explaining the real nature of strategy where complexity, dynamism, uncertainty and chaos reigned.^[14] It is not that we shouldn't use the construct, but we should know that there is much more to strategy than this formula.

There has been a shift in the meaning of strategy since its first conceptualisation by the pioneers of strategic thought. Clausewitz and Jomini adopted a narrower definition of strategy, which was limited to the use of military. Contemporary interpretation is inclined to comprise other instruments of national power than military. Strategy with its broader meaning is called as "grand strategy". It is more convenient to examine the strategy in the context of "levels of war" for a deeper understanding of its instrumental function and its evolution to grand strategy.

Levels of War and Strategy

There are four levels of war adopted by most of the armies, namely policy, strategy, operations and tactics. Traditionally, the construct has been discerned as three levels, but it became four levels with operational level's introduction in 1980s. In theory, politics produces policy. Strategy connects policy with military assets. It determines military forces and their tasks that can achieve the desired aims of policy. Operational and tactical levels execute concrete tasks decided by the strategy. (Figure 1)




Figure 1 : Levels of War and Strategy

The levels are different in nature and they answer different questions. Policy answers to the question of "why and what", while strategy seeks an answer for "how"; and tactics do it. Since there is no natural harmony between levels,^[15] it is quite difficult to provide coherence, and this is what strategy does. Strategy fills the gap between political goals and military capabilities through the command performance. It requires all levels of command to function properly.

The main challenge in strategy is to convert military power into political effect. It is very difficult because it requires an exceptional talent to determine which military action provides what policy wants. Gray uses bridge metaphor to explain the instrumentality function of the strategy. The bridge must operate in both ways; therefore, strategist needs not just to translate policy intentions to operations but also to adjust policy in the light of operations.^[16] This is done through negotiation. The strategies are developed in an ongoing process of negotiation among potent stakeholders, by a civilian-military partnership. Usually it is a committee process, but it is always driven by the character of key unique people's performance and strategic inspiration is usually a product of a single person, not a committee. However, this person, no matter how genius he is, needs a staff and confident subordinate commanders to translate his ideas to actionable plans.^[17]

It is important to discern that the strategy is not the use of forces itself. All forces of all kinds behave tactically-or operationally but produce strategic effect, whether it is special forces performing behind the lines of enemy or a Corps conducting a joint conventional attack against main body of enemy forces. In Gray's words, strategy can only be practiced tactically. All strategy has to be done by tactics, and all tactical effort has some strategic effect.^[18] Strategy is all about the consequences of tactical behaviours.

Despite their differences, all levels constitute a unity. If one level is absent, or not functioning well, this means all project is in jeopardy. When political guidance is weak or missing, the strategists cannot know the end-state to which they should lead their tactical enablers. If strategy is weak or absent despite the existence of a good political guidance, tactical forces might fight a wrong war however they are excellent in their fighting capabilities as there is no bridge converting political goals to actions. If there is no competent tactical ability, political and strategic endeavour becomes worthless.

Strategy summarized here represents the narrower understanding, which takes the military resources as main instruments to achieve policy goals and focuses on battlefield. Next section explains the shift in the meaning of strategy and its broader interpretation.

The Shift in the Meaning Strategy and Grand Strategy

As Hew Strachan indicated, there has been a shift in the meaning of the term "strategy" since it was first conceptualized by classical theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini. By 1900, strategy had been used to explain something done by generals to conduct the operations in a particular theatre.^[19] It usually referred to a relationship below politics, between strategy and tactics. But after two World Wars, where all national resources were used, and the Cold War, during which the deterrence without actual fighting became the essence of strategy, the function of strategy shifted to higher levels. Operational level, with its introduction in 1980s, took the place of what classical theorists called strategy, whereas strategy in practice became much more concerned with the connection between strategy and policy. In fact, strategy is started to be used as a synonym for policy.^[20]

Especially after First World War, more scholars such as Corbett, J.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart, Edward Mead Earle, Andre? Beaufre discussed on the broader meaning of the strategy. It was Fuller who introduced the term "grand strategy" in 1923. Edward Mead Earle, remarked in his famous book, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1943) that "Strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of non-military factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times."^[21] Earle, writing in the middle of Second World War, emphasizes the importance of non-military factors and defines strategy as an inherent element of statecraft at all times, which implies that the strategy inevitably must be rendered as the grand strategy. Colin S. Gray, contemporary strategy theorist, mentions the same thought in different words.

All strategy is grand strategy. Military strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework, if only in order to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to bear. A security community cannot design and execute a strictly military strategy. No matter the character of a conflict, be it a total war for survival or a contest for limited stakes, even if military activity by far is the most prominent of official behaviours, there must still be political-diplomatic, social-cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war(...) Whether or not a state or other security community designs a grand strategy explicitly, all of its assets will be in play in a conflict. The only difference between having and not having an explicit grand strategy, lies in the degree of cohesion among official behaviours and, naturally as a consequence of poor cohesion, in the likelihood of success.^[22]

As Gray eloquently stated, whether it is a limited conflict or a major war, all conflicts inherently include dimensions other than military. In a limited warfare, a smaller number of dimensions can be in play whereas in a major war, almost all national powers are mobilized. There might be cases that military plays no part. Instead of direct use of force, sometimes, only the threat of force can provide the desired effects. But whether it is the leading component or not, military is indispensable in designing and executing grand strategy. Figure-2 is a simple depiction of how grand strategy works.

Lonsdale & Kane grouped instruments of grand strategy in four categories: military, diplomacy, intelligence and economy.[23] I prefer the "intelligence" to be included under the broader term of "psychological" aspect, which includes propaganda and information warfare




Figure 2 : Grand Strategy

as well. Although these categories are the most relevant aspects to the national security, there can be more instruments based on the context and the characteristics of the state in question. For instance, if a state has a separate technology ministry, there is no doubt it is involved in developing grand strategy. Depending on the context, it would even be possible to add an agricultural aspect. Dotted boxes in Figure-2 refers to this fact.

Key Features of Strategy

This part so far explained what strategy and grand strategy is, how strategy function within the levels of war, how it is done and who does it. The remaining section will discuss some key aspects required in strategy-making. The following eight factors are eternal dimensions of the strategy, valid for all wars, whereas their relative weights depend on the context of specific war. Each factor plays its part, in every conflict. (Figure 3)

Adversary

Strategy is carried out by properly aligning ends, ways, and means, but always against an intelligent enemy. As Carl von Clausewitz stated, "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." [24] Without an enemy there can be no duel, so without an enemy there can be no strategy. While it is central to the strategy, the role of the enemy is often overlooked by the strategists. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars showed once again that the enemy has a vote. The US expectation of being greeted as the liberators in Iraq, or George W. Bush's "mission



Figure 3 : Grand Strategy and Key Features

accomplished" announcement after the invasion are some recent examples of how the enemy is often neglected. Tactical actions are meaningful or can produce strategic effects only when impairing the opponent's strategy making process.

Complexity

The concept of chaos, disorder and confusion is dominant in strategic theory.[25] A country at war is an incredibly complex system of systems,[26] given that it requires the participation of thousands, or millions of people, organized by different parties. Beatrice Heuser suggests that one of the key features of war is that it is a function of interconnected variables, which makes it quite complicated.[27]

One of the best explanations on variables of war belongs to Clausewitz, who was the first to understand war as a nonlinear system. Clausewitz postulates that any war has three sets of variables, namely primordial violence and hostility, the play of chance and probability, and reason.[28] What makes war so complex is that it is suspended between these tendencies pulling different directions, "like an object suspended between three magnets." As Van Riper noted, this analogy is a description of a nonlinear system, whose parts have freedom of movement and it is impossible to balance their tendencies.[29]

Friction is another reason why war and strategy are so complex. Clausewitz states that accumulation of all difficulties in the war causes a friction which impedes strategic performance. This makes the apparently easy so difficult. According to Clausewitz, the source of friction is "the climate of war" which is composed of "danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance." [30] The future is not foreseeable due to friction and the intelligent enemy. All of these factors contribute to the complexity of strategy.

Human and Culture

Human is the best evidence of eternal fundamentals of war. Despite the continuous progress in technology and social life, human with its inherent characteristics stays at the center of war. Increasing connectivity allows us to do all sorts of things, from commerce to education, differently. But as a human, actions we do are all the same. We still buy and sell, teach and learn or get angry when we are ill-treated.[31] The strategy is devised, executed, and maintained by people. As Gray indicated, in most cases, historians mention "France decided..." or "2nd Brigade invaded...", however, it is humans but not governments or

military units performing in reality. The fact that the main role of humans will not change in the future makes humans an important aspect of war.

Since the human is indispensable for strategy, so the culture in which human was born is. Culture has an impact on strategy as the strategists are encultured by their own nations' beliefs, habits or customs. Its impact could be both on the strategic and tactical levels. For instance, the leaders at the strategic level can make imprudent and biased decisions just because of their culture. Soldiers at the tactical level could become fierce warriors with the emotions that their culture imposed on them. As Bernard Brodie noted: "Good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department. Napoleon despised the Russians as somewhat subhuman, as did Hitler after him, and in each case, fate exacted a terrible penalty for that judgment." [32]

Technology

Almost in all historical cases, it is not the weapons themselves that provide strategic advantage. It is the ability of using technology in conjunction with other dimensions of war to achieve the desired policy end state. It requires the combination of significant other resources. Consider that there are oil rich countries today that have state of the art military technologies, but it is hard to see their effect on the battlefield. Germany's use of tanks in masse in Second World War was an organizational innovation rather than technological.

David Betz gives us a good criterion to understand the point where the influence of technology changes the nature of war. "War will remain as it ever was until the humanity comes to the point of 'The Singularity', at which human intelligence is surpassed by machine intelligence." [33] As long as wars are conducted by people, technology stays as a key feature, but does not become a final arbiter.

Geography

Geography has always influence, and will always be, on planning, executing and maintaining strategies. That's why the ideas of two geopolitical theorists, Mackinder and Spykman, are still relevant today. [34] For instance, it has always been vital for Russia to have access to warm water, to the Mediterranean Sea. This means that Russia has always had a conflicting interest with the country between Russia and Mediterranean Sea, no matter which country it is. It was

Ottoman Empire in the past, today it is Turkey. Russia would never prefer a strong country in that region as long as it exists as a robust power. This is all about location. Geography is the destiny.

In some cases, geography becomes very important just because of its constraining features, such as rugged terrain, extreme distance or bad weather conditions as it was experienced in Both Napoleon and Hitler's campaigns against Russia. It is true that advances in technology decreased the relative effect of geography in terms of its limitations, but never to the degree to ignore it totally.

Logistics

As it is stated in US Joint Logistics Publication 4.0 [35], "The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application." It is so basic but a vital fact that armies cannot fight no matter how capable they are unless they can move to operation area and they are continued to be supplied. General Omar Bradley indicated this simple fact with a bit of exaggeration when he said, "amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics"[36] Logistics is one of the eternal dimensions of the strategy that needs to be considered. It is essential to strategy at all levels and for every type of warfare. Great developments in technology, whether in transportation or in IT, have not yet reached to the point that we can assume the logistic challenges are no longer is a main concern.

Doctrine

Military doctrine is a product of intellectual activity to determine how military force should be applied [37] and what methods to use to carry out a military objective.[38] It includes a set of prescriptions about how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities, and the modes of cooperation between different types of forces.[39] It is the best military practice of the day and it is usually derived from the past experience.

So, why is it so important to include doctrine as a key feature of strategy? Because employed correctly, it is one of the key enablers of strategy, by greatly enhancing fighting power. In Gray's words, "it is an important transmission belt connecting strategic theory with tactical performance." [40] In a sense, it is the concretization of the strategy, based on the circumstances

of the day. However, it could become very dangerous if it is applied dogmatically, which would mean that you use your combat arm in a completely wrong manner. Therefore, doctrine should be revised periodically.

Strategy is a Whole

None of the aspects of strategic theory can be omitted in the conduct of war or strategy. War and strategy are interactively complex systems, a nonlinear phenomenon, where all parts in flux and play their role. Technology has a huge impact on war, but human, ethics, geography and logistics etc. do as well. It is so complex in its working parts that it is not possible to approach war through one or two perspectives. Clausewitz stated, "in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together." [41] Therefore, as Paul Van Riper indicated, it is useless to insist on approaching war with linear methods as Americans do. [42]

All the dimensions of strategy explained here are valid for all wars. However, every war is a different combination of them which were articulated by the strategists and commanders based on the conditions of the day. The war is "a function of interconnected variables" [43] whose weights differs by the context and circumstances. The purpose or the intensity of the war could vary from one war to the next, or even multiple times within the same war. Therefore, dimensions of war are dynamic, both influence the outcome of war and are influenced by one another. Strategy must be considered as a whole and in any given moment, an effective strategy requires careful analysis on weighing up the options where many variables must be considered to decide whether tactical deeds can be converted into political capital, in a continuously fluid and context-dependent environment.

Hybrid Warfare Concept

Hybrid Warfare has gradually gained traction in defence community since its first use in 2005. Even before Russia's annexation of Crimea, it was widely referred as a model for contemporary warfare in defence communities. But after 2014, it gained a new momentum to the degree that it was frequently cited as a new kind of warfare. The term frequently circulated in distinct fora ranging from newspapers to official strategic documents. In the rest of the paper, I will use the term "Hoffman's hybrid concept" to refer the military-dominant notion

that permeated before 2014. Therefore, it is more helpful to discuss hybrid warfare in two phases, before and after Russia's annexation of Crimea.

Hybrid Warfare has gradually gained traction in defence community since its first use in 2005.

Hybrid Warfare as a Military Concept

It was Frank Hoffman who developed the hybrid warfare concept in a series of articles and books. He refined the "hybrid warfare concept" as part of a research program, through examining a number of past theories, mainly 4th Generation Warfare, Compound War and Unrestricted Warfare. Then he explained the concept in detail in his seminal paper, "Conflict in 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars", in 2007.

He projected that future wars will be a convergence of distinct challengers into multi-modal wars which blends the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical fervour of irregular warfare, both in terms of organizations and the means. In the context of the research program, he studied on a number of historical examples, but he couldn't find the multi-dimensionality, operational integration or the exploitation of information domain to the degree that they expected from hybrid wars. It was Hezbollah, who fought against Israel in 2006, that he found as the clearest example of a modern hybrid challenger.[44]

He defined hybrid threats as "incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder." For Hoffman, hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors, by separate units, or even by the same unit, but operationally and tactically directed within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects both in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.

To Hoffman, what makes hybrid wars different from previous wars is its blurring even at lower levels. He acknowledges that many wars in the past had regular and irregular components, but they were rather combined at the strategic level and were conducted in different theatres or in distinct formations. Hybrid wars in contrast, blended those forces into the same force in the same battlespace even at operational and tactical levels.[45] If one is to summarize the study of Hoffman at one word, it would be "blurring".

Despite some early critiques, hybrid warfare, popularized by Hoffman, has become as common as to appear like new orthodoxy in military thought.[46] As Hoffman noted himself,

hybrid threats found traction in official documents of various US defence circles and many high-level officials cited it in their speeches as a sound concept.[47]

Hybrid Warfare After Russia's War in Ukraine

It wouldn't be wrong to say that the use of the term got out of control after Russia's war in Crimea and Ukraine. As Galeotti suggested, Western authorities perceived that a "new kind of war" is being employed by Russia[48] and they almost unanimously referred to Russia's war as a model for hybrid warfare. Its use in distinct fora gained a huge momentum. It permeated the doctrines and military concepts of NATO, EU and their member countries.[49] NATO and the EU officially agreed to collaborate against hybrid threats. However, few analysts used the actual concept of Hoffman, they rather loosely referred to the hybridity, but usually implying very different meanings.

NATO's adoption had a huge effect on the popularity of the term because of its critical role as an international security actor and its influence on many of western nations. NATO agreed on a strategy about countering hybrid warfare at the end of 2015.[50] as a continuation of its decision at Wales Summit in 2014. At Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Alliance announced its determination to address the challenges posed by hybrid threats.[51] It established a Hybrid Analysis Branch at NATO HQ in Brussels.

The EU, on the other hand, just a few months later after NATO announced its strategy, developed a "joint framework" focusing on the EU's response to hybrid threats. Based on this framework, it established a Hybrid Fusion Cell within Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and created two Strategic Communication Task Forces against misinformation. Additionally, "European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats" was established in Finland in 2017. EU Global Strategy projected a close cooperation with NATO on countering hybrid threats. A recent report on NATO-EU Cooperation, prepared based on interviews with NATO-EU officials, identifies hybrid threats as one of the major challenges in common between two organizations.[52]

NATO's definition of hybrid threats seems similar to the definition permeating academic circles. NATO members agreed in 2015 that "Hybrid warfare and its supporting tactics can include broad, complex, adaptive, opportunistic and often integrated combinations of conventional and unconventional methods. These activities could be overt or covert, involving military, paramilitary, organized criminal networks and civilian actors across all

elements of power."[53] The EU has broadly defined hybrid threats as a "mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and nonconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare".[54] Although both definitions are similar to Hoffman's definition, there is an increasing emphasis on the broader aspects of strategy other than military, such as diplomacy, economics, technology, etc. This is more obvious in Military Balance-2015's description of Russia's Hybrid Warfare; "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure."[55]

One can figure out that with Russia's War in Ukraine, the definition of the concept became more inclusive and tends to focus more on non-military factors while Hofmann's definition was military dominant.

Critiques of Hybrid Warfare

On the one hand, NATO, EU, or Western nations have officially adopted the hybrid warfare concept in their core documents. Many politicians, analysts, military practitioners or journalists continue to use the term widely. On the other hand, there is an increasing number of critiques about the validity and the use of the concept. Critiques can be grouped into five themes. 1- Hybrid Warfare is about Tactics, 2- Hybrid Warfare is not New, 3- It is An Ambiguous Definition and A Weak Concept, 4- Hybrid Warfare Creates an Unnecessary Category, 5- Hybrid Warfare is Under the Threshold of Article 5. Next chapter will analyse hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory, first by focusing on the main critics mentioned above, then making a general assessment.

An Assessment of Hybrid Warfare Through the Lens of Strategic Theory

Hybrid Warfare is about Tactics

Hoffman claims that new type of warfare he introduces is consistent with Clausewitz's strategic theory but makes no further explanations about "how".^[56] Implicit in his studies that Hoffman attempts to conceptualize the contemporary warfare. However, by boiling-down

the war to the convergence of distinct modalities of war, organizations, and actors, this concept just focuses on operational and tactical levels.

"Hybrid" as an adjective which precedes "warfare" requires more than Hoffman's concept because warfare includes much more than the blurring of the modes, forces, or actors. Figure 4 shows where hybrid warfare falls in the realm of strategic theory. The idea that new approaches such as "hybrid warfare" can lead to repeatable military victories is an astrategic approach that overemphasizes operational capabilities and doctrine at the expense of strategy.^[57] Focusing too much on tactics, hybrid warfare becomes counter-productive to strategy by ruling out key features. Hoffman himself confessed that his theory fails to capture non-violent actions, such as economic, financial, subversive acts or information operations.^[58] The concept in its original form as Hoffman postulated could be the topic of a military doctrine at best. In fact, the name that Cox et al. proposed, "convergent trends in tactics" would perfectly fit to Hoffman's concept.^[59]

It is only after Russia's annexation of Crimea that non-military factors more frequently began to be incorporated to the definition. However, these factors were comprised in an arbitrary rather than in a systemic way. The term has usually been associated with propaganda, information warfare, or cyber-attacks, which constitute only some aspects of warfare, thereby lacking a holistic view.

It is interesting and ironic that the defence community rediscovers "grand strategy" with each new term coined. As Galeotti noted, Military Balance-2015's description of hybrid warfare is not different from the corollary of the Clausewitzian doctrine.^[60] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated in 2015 that Russia's hybrid warfare can be seen as a "dark reflection" of comprehensive approach, which is not different from grand strategy in essence. One cannot keep himself from asking, "why then we keep coining new labels just to rediscover grand strategy in the end?"

Hybrid Warfare is not New

Not only the use of a new term such as "hybrid" suggests that it is a new kind of warfare, but also many analysts, journalists, and Hoffman himself claimed that a new way of warfare had emerged. In fact, hybridization is an inherent nature of all wars because sole conventional or irregular war can only be expected to exist on paper.^[61] As Echevarria noted, from a historical standpoint, hybrid war has been the norm, but conventional war has been the illusion.^[62] For

instance, Second World War, known as a prominent example of the conventional war, included many irregular aspects from the use of propaganda to the subversion^[63] if the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 and Russia's wars in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 are regarded as hybrid wars, then a great number of wars in the past are nothing than hybrid war.^[64] However, with the lack of historical experience, many experts believe that so-called hybrid wars are a new kind of warfare.

Going back to Hoffman's concept, one can see the evolution in the thought of Hoffman regarding the novelty of the concept. While he argued that the convergence of different modes of war at lower levels is new,^[65] two years later, he stated, "The combination of irregular and conventional force capabilities, either operationally or tactically integrated, is quite challenging, but historically it is not necessarily a unique phenomenon."^[66] This was an important divergence from his previous thought.

It doesn't seem logical to assume that the Vietnam War does not present an example of hybrid warfare, just by supposing that it is not blurred enough at operational or tactical levels while Boer War does.^[67] One should understand that while strategic thought has fundamentals that don't change, warfare is context-dependent and at the tactical level can take infinite forms on the continuum of hybridity.

An Ambiguous Definition and A Weak Concept

Hybrid warfare is too inclusive to be analytically useful.^[68] It includes almost every type of warfare in its definition. Any violence can be labelled "hybrid" as long as it doesn't have the characteristics of a single form of warfare. This broadness allows both Russia's war in Ukraine and ISIL's war in Syria to be referred as a model for hybrid warfare. Causing a good deal of qualifications to be associated with hybrid threats, this broadness creates a perfect enemy with magical powers and strategic prowess^[69] as it had been in the case of West's perception of enemy image of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It evolved to such an inclusive term that even the public statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov can be labelled as hybrid warfare when he criticized the German police for the lack of transparency with regards to the alleged rape of a 13-year old Russian girl in Berlin.^[70]

Hoffman's concept is also criticized as too narrow. Glenn suggests that the concept has a narrow view and he proposes "comprehensive approach" as a better construct to address the breadth of the challenges.^[71] Probably, because of this shortcoming, later definitions of the

concept by NATO, the EU, and others included broader aspects of warfare. However, this has been done by arbitrary additions to the original form, which creates confusion and ambiguity. For this reason, it has frequently been referred for non-military factors whereas the original form had military basis. The concept evolved to a term that generally refers to any malicious influence short of war.^[72] Had the defence community looked through the lens of strategic theory from the beginning, probably it wouldn't have needed a new term to explain contemporary warfare.

Hybrid Warfare Creates an Unnecessary Category

Hoffman is right when he criticizes the West's binary view of war as traditional and irregular for being oversimplified and when he claims that war is a continuum. Wars could take any form in the continuum that is framed by irregular warfare at the one end and the conventional warfare on the other. However, he made the exact same mistake when he restricted the warfare somewhere in the middle of the continuum, for a foreseeable future, to the mixture of multi-modes. Instead, we need to understand that every war is unique and any alternative within the continuum is possible at any time. This point of view not only excludes broader elements of strategic theory, but also urges people to expect future conflicts to be hybrid in character. As Strachan warned, it has the fatal risk of becoming another category.^[73] If we stick to a standard description (like hybrid warfare), we might have difficulty in understanding the potential for change as each war is waged.

From the point of strategic theory, categories are too exclusive to capture the complexity and richness of strategic historical experience. For example, Russia, as a regular actor, employs irregular means and methods as many state actors did in history. Should we name its war as irregular? Actors do not necessarily need to employ the means and methods described in one category. In some cases, it may require switching the kind of warfare even within the same war, as it occurred in US-Iraq War. Categorization privileges specialization at the expense of adaptability.^[74] Gray maintained in his insightful monograph on categorization.

the well-intentioned quest after a better grasp on the ever-changing characteristics of conflict misled our strategic theoretical entomologists. What they claim to have done is to discover new species of strategic or strategically relevant behaviour, when what they have done is to erect conceptual constructions that, in their empirically better evidenced aspects, really are only subspecies, or variants of the one species that is war.^[75]

This is a very good explanation for what has been experienced with hybrid warfare concept. Both Hoffman's concept or its later construct explains only some part while claiming to describe the whole. Categorization could be helpful to some extent in understanding different characteristics in war and warfare, however, by familiarizing too much, often time they cause to decontextualize and to lose holistic view.^[76]

Hybrid Warfare is Under the Threshold of Article 5

There is a perception that hybrid warfare is conducted under the threshold of international law, such as Article 51 of UN Charter and Article 5 of NATO, even though the concept does not postulate such a specific understanding. This perception stems from the defence community's preference to label Russia's all covert actions as hybrid warfare, not necessarily from the concept itself. The practice of operating under the threshold of law is not new or something pertaining to hybrid warfare, it had been undertaken frequently during the Cold War, much before hybrid warfare concept emerged.

The real problem lies in our perspective that sees current events through the lens of the so-called hybrid warfare concept. If the defence community can succeed to give up the habit of labelling every malicious event short of war as a hybrid threat, it would be easier to see what really happens. For instance, Echevarria proposes a classic coercive-deterrence construct as a way to approach so-called "grey-zone wars" or "hybrid wars" such as Russia's in Ukraine or China's in South China Sea. For Echevarria, these types of wars which takes place under Article-5 threshold, can be reduced to the core dynamic of coercive-deterrence strategies, which is usually conducted before almost every war.^[77]

Additionally, it is a mistake to see NATO's Article 5 as a rigid, unchangeable border. One should not forget that if aggressive actions of Russia and China reach the point that NATO members and their allies cannot tolerate any more, it is only a matter of days to amend the interpretation of Article-5. For example, subversive means that Russia has been using within neighbours could be interpreted as an armed attack if those means cause violence within the state.

A General Assessment

In his seminal paper about hybrid wars, Hoffman wrote the following assessment on Fourth Generation Warfare.

Whether this really is something entirely new, "visible and distinctly different from the forms of war that preceded it," has emerged as challengeable. What has occurred is simply part of war's evolution, a shift in degree rather than kind, and a return to older and horrific cases. 4GW advocates do not deny the existence of irregular warfare techniques and the return to medieval warfare. But they do tend to overlook Clausewitz, who noted that war is "more than a chameleon," with continuous adaptation in character in every age. Very little in what is described as fundamentally different in the 4GW literature is all that inconsistent with a Clausewitzian understanding of war as a contest of human wills.^[78]

It is ironic that I use his own words to criticize Hoffman's concept. This assessment by Hofmann applies to his hybrid warfare concept. What is described as fundamentally different in hybrid warfare, whether the convergence of the modes of warfare or "further complexity," are all consistent with strategic theory. What has occurred is simply part of war's evolution, as Hoffman eloquently summarized, there is a change in degree, but not in kind. In Gray's words, "war is essentially more of the same."^[79]

Echevarria compares "hybrid warfare" with "blitzkrieg" of the 1940s, a label that was never an official term in German military doctrine, but polished by media and commentators.^[80] In fact, a closer look on the transformation of Russia's military since 2008 shows that Russia does not place the hybrid warfare at the centre of its military policy.^[81] What makes Germans successful in the beginning of 1940s and Russians in 2014-2015 was not the labels attached to their operations, it was skilful direction of statecraft, leveraging the principles of war; knowing the enemy and itself very well. Russia has been using the best means at his toolbox to achieve its policy goals, whether it is hard power as it was in the east, of Ukraine or soft power against Western populations.

It is crucial to understand that war is context dependent. It is a function of interconnected variables where all variables are in flux. There are myriad possibilities that enemy, friendly forces or the environment can take different forms. Before, during, and at the end of each war, governments must develop and adjust their strategy accordingly. They must be ready to apply a different combination of tools from their capability toolbox, as it occurred in three consecutive wars of Russia, in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria. Specific conditions require distinct countermeasures, which could range from subversive means, socio-economic measures to the direct use of military forces. Russia had a swift and surprising success in Crimea thanks to some enablers, such as the presence of Russian base and forces, the presence of pro-Russian civil population, and a weak government control of Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, used proxy

forces-pro-Russian rebels without any evidence of direct linkage, though it had to step in at some stage with its sophisticated fire power. In Syria, it supported the regime forces mainly by assisting in air power, air defence systems and military consultation. Under the broader goal of being a great power again, Russia has different aims in three consequent wars, hence three different strategies. As Galeotti points out, Russia wanted to annex Crimea and to create a new order, whereas its aim was to create controlled chaos and to force Kiev to acknowledge Moscow's regional hegemony in Eastern Ukraine.^[82] In Syria, if we take the words of Alexander Dugin, the Russian philosopher and nationalist who has influence on the Kremlin, Russia's ultimate aim is to show the world that "a Middle East without Western presence is possible".^[83] Russia has chosen three different sets of ways and means in its three-consequent warfare. They were not all necessarily hybrid wars by definition. What Russia is doing is to pursue its policy goals by the best combination of the instruments of grand strategy.

Instead of putting the warfare into the categories, the best way is to understand the lines of evolution in different perspectives such as technology, economy, sociology etc. and their impact on warfare. Understanding the nature of war, we need to focus on the change in degree rather than the kinds of warfare. For instance, if we take Russia as the case, we should determine the areas where Russia shows progress. Galeotti lists three areas where the Russians are distinctive in degree; 1) Giving primacy to non-kinetic operations, especially information warfare 2) Increasing connections with non-state actors 3) Single command structure coheres and coordinates political and military operations.^[84] This is a good summary of where we need to focus our efforts on.

Conclusion

Strategic theory is a depiction of the eternal principles of strategy, which has a literature century long. There are indeed very few things that haven't been discussed in the history of strategic theory. Looking through strategic theory, we can keep ourselves from rediscovering old ideas. It provides us with an unbiased approach to modern warfare.


This paper has demonstrated that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept and strategic theory provides a robust viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. In fact, there is only one war with some more or less active warfare. What is required is to have a holistic vision of the strategic context and the adaptability to meet unique challenges of the day through the use of all instruments of grand strategy. Given that every challenge is unique in many important details, whether it is regular, irregular, or hybrid, they must be approached

as political challenges in the first instance, then as grand strategic challenges. If it is decided that the challenge requires a military reaction, then grand strategy must employ the military instrument tailored against that specific challenge. One should note that it may not require a purely military option. As we have been experienced in Russia's hybrid warfare, the categorization encourages tactical thinking focused upon enemy's fighting methods, rather than upon strategic effectiveness in the conflict as a whole.^[85] As Renz pointed out, we oversimplify Russian Foreign Policy by narrowing down our vision to hybrid theory.^[86] The hybrid concept becomes counter-productive to strategy.

I would like to conclude with the words of former Danish Chief of Defence, General Knud Bartels, who presided over the NATO Military Committee between 2012-2015. He experienced Crimea crisis first-hand as the Chairman in 2014. His words are a good summary of this paper's the main theme.

Hybrid warfare is a fancy term to name what we have always known as "war". Life is very complicated and many of our nations love simple clear-cut definitions when they face complicated issues. War is war that you can conduct in many different ways. It doesn't always need to be main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, mechanized infantry, frigates, destroyer, aircraft carriers etc. It can also be subversive operations. But war has no purpose other than to achieve a political goal. Hybrid warfare is just a way of fighting a war which has a political purpose... It doesn't change the fact that as military personnel, in our commands, we make an assessment, we try to understand our adversary, we try to find what are his strong sides, what are his weak sides, and we try of course to focus on the weak sides and to shield off his strong sides. Military strategy is how you are going to fight the war, operations is how you want to fight the battle and tactics is how you fight in the battle. When I define how I want to fight war that's where, as a military commander, I will make a decision whether I want to use hybrid warfare or not. It's very relevant to study hybrid warfare now, but to elevate it as a new type of warfare, that's wrong.^[87]

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Prof. Sen is an acclaimed expert on strategic issues and national security, is currently associated with several educational institutions and think tanks. Between 2017 and 2019, he has authored several books, - his latest "National Interest and National Security Policymaking Prism for India", The Purpose of India's Security Strategy: Defence, Deterrence and Global Involvement and An Anthology of Papers on National Security.



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